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Abstract:
After twenty years, the European Union is undoubtedly at a crossroads, as its
institutions try to manage the sovereign debt crisis in member states and the uncertainty
surrounding the future direction of the project. The challenges the European Union has
faced, and the response to them, have drawn considerable attention on the capacity of the
European Union to manage the interests of the Europeans. In this dissertation, I discuss
the process of Europeanization and why it has resulted in suboptimal outputs.
Additionally, I discuss the perception of a democratic deficit in the European Union. The
purpose of this is to see how perception of the capacity of the European Union to manage
European interests and perception of a democratic deficit impact trust levels on the
European Union. Using Eurobarometer 71.3 data, I find support for the hypothesis that
those who perceive shortcomings in both of these aspects will be less likely to trust the
European Union than those who do not. I argue that this finding makes the handling of
sovereign debt crisis very important in determining the levels of trust the EU will enjoy
moving beyond the crisis. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about European
identity in the contemporary era, and ask if the construction of a European identity might
help the project withstand criticisms over policy and responsiveness.
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“In God We Trust: Everybody else pays cash.”1

Introduction:
In 2010 and 2011, a wide array of industrial democracies seemed to face crises of
declining trust in their capacity to manage internal conflict domestically and external
challenges brought on by an increasingly globalized world. The problems that plagued
individual states were perhaps magnified at the European Union level. Massive budget
deficits and compounding national debt levels in Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and
Italy forced action from the unofficial leaders of the European Monetary Union as the
bond market suggested that some of its member states faced an imminent defaulting on
loans if not for significant intervention at the European level, which included a bailout.
In return, the governments were forced to adopt austerity measures that culminated in
protests from citizens within the states. Additionally, although the Maastricht Treaty had
established a pillar for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European
Union in 1992, the member states had responded inchoately to the major security and
foreign policy issues of the subsequent two decades, most notably in regard to Iraq and
more recently in regard to an escalation of civil conflict in the bordering state of Libya.
The difference, of course, is that unlike at the state-level, voters have
comparatively limited options to express their discontent with European Union policy.
The European Parliament is the only democratically-elected branch of the EU
government, and previous research has shown considerable voter apathy regarding EP
elections, and furthermore has promulgated the notion that EP elections are merely
1

Quote obtained from Citrin, page 973. Origin unknown.
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second-order elections in which voters either punish or reward the performance of
domestic member-state government. (Slater 1982, Reif 1980) Additionally, when the
electorates in France, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands have thrown a wrench into
the integration process, they have been either asked to reconsider the deal in a second
referendum or watch as they were bypassed altogether by ramming the treaty through the
Parliament. (Franklin 1994)
The question that gets to the heart of this matter is how much do citizens in
member states trust the European Union? Have EU institutions evolved and are they
operating in a manner that is conducive to perceived institutional legitimacy, or is the EU
a supranational institution that is curtailing the sovereignty of member states while their
respective electorates are rendered powerless? In this dissertation, I am hoping to offer
insight into these questions surrounding levels of trust in the European Union, a
supranational entity that has undoubtedly grown in power significantly in the last 20
years.

Defining Trust:
To begin, it is important to establish a working definition of the concept of
institutional trust. This is easier said than done, and when scholars take on this task, they
are met with warnings like that from Daniel Metlay (1999) who argues that this endeavor
is a “journey into a conceptual quagmire.” To be sure, scholars have yet to establish a
singular working definition of institutional trust, and the risk of Sartori’s “conceptual
stretching” is seemingly high when taking on a concept that is deceptively simple at first
sight, but grows more complex upon further reflection. “Political trust is a concept that
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people think they understand until they are asked to define it.”2 Marc Hetherington
(2004) shares the Metlay sentiment that one need look no further than how many
different definitions of political trust scholars use as an indication of how poorly defined
this concept remains.
For the purpose of this study, the definition of trust shall be the extent to
which political institutions sustain a pervasive sense of legitimacy amongst those
whom they govern. It is important to point out that this does not mean every individual
who occupies a position within the institutional framework enjoys widespread trust, nor
do I suggest that short-run variances in trust levels pose a significant threat to the
viability of a democratic regime. The heart of the matter gets to how much institutions
are valued, even when they produce policies that are contradictory to the public’s
preferences or ask the majority to make sacrifices for the good of the society. Some
attempts to define political trust have insufficient in capturing the true nature of the
concept. Niklas Luhmann (1979) defines trust as a commodity that helps political actors
to achieve their goals. This definition is adequate at the personal level, and I think that
most people would think it is intuitive that a leader who earned the trust of people would
have more leeway in exerting his or her will over the society than a person who had not
earned trust. Nevertheless, the definition is lacking in terms of missing the institutional
component of the concept, which I argue should entail an unknown individual being
trusted as a given based on their being cloaked in the authority of his or her position, such
as a police officer.

Mark Warren (1999) similarly misses the mark with his definition of

trust as being something that peoples’ willingness to follow the leadership of others.
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William Gamson (1968) accurately captured the importance of institutional trust
by characterizing it as the “creator of collective power”.3 For Gamson, a basic level of
trust is essential for any democracy as it allows the government to avoid resorting to
coercion to exert its will or consulting with the people on every day to day decision.
Evoking the language of the Leviathan, James Madison noted in Federalist no. 51 that,
“government would not be necessary if men were angels.”4 The Founders were wary of
direct democracy, and believed the American Republic should be predicated on the
notion of representative government in which the people elect leaders to make decisions
on their behalf. Nevertheless, Madison in Federalist no. 10 indicated a distrust of
potential leaders as well, noting that “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
helm.”5
The Founders of the American Republic were, at their core, distrustful of power
that was concentrated into any one person’s hands. Given their experience under the
British Crown and the subsequent revolution they led to free themselves from it, the
Founders were careful to craft an institutional design that prevented any one person from
amassing too much power in his or her hands. Thus the institutional design of the
American Republic is an attempt to balance the Founders’ distrust of direct democracy
(power in everybody’s hands) and distrust in democracy which is concentrated into the
hands of one representative.

3
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Trust in the American Government- Where most work on trust comes from:
The comparatively difficult legislative process in the United States is the result of
the institutional design that requires both houses of the legislative branch and the
executive to give their consent to the vast majority of the policies and laws of the
American government. Even after that considerable hurdle is overcome, almost all
controversial laws face a legal challenge regarding their Constitutionality, and many are
ultimately struck down by the Courts which enjoy the power of judicial review in the
United States. The American legislative process is comparatively slow-moving when
compared to parliamentary systems in which the prime minister typically commands a
working majority within a basically unicameral and fused legislative and executive
branch. There is an adage in comparative politics that the American system works “in
spite of itself”, an insinuation that the Framer’s vision for a functioning government
guided by the principle of separation of powers would not be a feasible goal for many
countries in the world. Even in the United States, the passage and signing of President
Obama’s health care reform in 2009 revealed some of the unseemly realties of the
legislative process in its modern sense. Supporters of the bill were frustrated with the
slow-moving nature of the process due to the large coalition that it takes in order for the
legislation to overcome procedural hurdles, particularly in the United States Senate, and
the manner in which the bill became “watered down” to ensure enough support for
passage. Opponents decried the inclusion of well-documented bribes to wavering
Senators Landrieu and Nelson (nicknamed the “Louisiana Purchase” and “Cornhusker
Kickback”). Additionally, the little-known budgetary procedure of reconciliation
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suddenly became a household term after many Republicans decried its usage to bypass a
Republican filibuster in the Senate.
There are obvious variations in levels of societal trust in political institutions
cross-nationally and these differences have important implications for the political
process in each respective country. The disputed 2000 Presidential election in the United
States was one of the closest and controversial in American history. At the end of a long
night of vote counting, Republican nominee George W. Bush and Democratic nominee
Al Gore both found themselves needing Florida’s 25 electoral votes to put them over the
270 threshold it takes to secure a majority in the Electoral College. Amidst widespread
reports of electoral irregularities and every major television network falsely projecting
and then recanting a win for both candidates, the two candidates found themselves
separated by less than 2,000 votes out of over 6,000,000 votes cast at the end of the night,
which prompted an automatic recount by Florida’s election rules and made the absentee
and provisional ballot counting an utmost priority. Both sides filed lawsuits in the
aftermath of that evening, prompting Florida Supreme Court, and ultimately the United
States Supreme Court to intervene. By a 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore, the United States
Supreme Court halted the recount process, which prompted an immediate concession by
Al Gore who was on the losing end of the tally by 567 votes. In his concession speech,
Vice President Gore articulated the concept of institutional trust in a simple and eloquent
manner.
“Now the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt, while I
strongly disagree with the court's decision, I accept it. I accept the finality of this
outcome which will be ratified next Monday in the Electoral College. And
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tonight, for the sake of our unity of the people and the strength of our democracy,
I offer my concession.”6

Such a close and controversial ending to such a major election like the 2000 Presidential
contest almost surely would have led to violence in upheaval in many countries around
the world, but in the United States, supporters of Vice President Gore generally
committed themselves to putting the disputed election behind them and moving forward,
just as the Vice President had urged them to do. While debate rages on about the legality
of the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, virtually nobody questions the court’s right to
make the decision. Charles Hauss (2009) attributes this to a deeply felt sense of
legitimacy that is prevalent in the world’s successful democracies which causes people to
“accept the rules of the game.”7 Nevertheless, in his passionate dissent of the majority
decision in Bush v. Gore, Justice John Paul Stevens noted that the fallout from the
decision could have long-term consequences for the Court, including a decrease in trust
levels.
“What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida election
procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the
state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to
proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The endorsement of
that position by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most
cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the
men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of
the rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will be
inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”8

6

Transcript of Gore concession speech obtained from: http://www.commondreams.org/views/121300108.htm
7
Hauss, page 33
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Seminal Studies on Institutional Trust:
Scholars have been pursuing a conceptualization of institutional trust since the
1960’s in the United States. Arthur Miller (1974) parsed no words in articulating the
importance of examining institutional trust in his seminal study. Miller stated that
democratic regimes that have lost the confidence of their societies run the risk of being
overthrown by revolution.9 Miller views the relationship between state and society as a
psychological balance between institutional outputs and the public satisfaction with said
results. For Miller, the greater the disparity between the actual outputs and expected
outputs, the more likely the result will be that there is a decline in institutional trust in the
democratic institutions. Incidentally, this is similar to the relative depravation argument
that Davies (1962) makes for why revolutions occur. Davies’ important contribution to
the revolution literature was that differences in expectations and outputs could ultimately
culminate in a revolution to punish the regime that failed to keep pace with the societal
demands.
However, for Miller, the presence of widespread discontent with democratic
institutions in and of itself is not enough to warrant such a dramatic outcome, and in fact
can ultimately be beneficial as it can initiate a process of social change. Miller argues
that periods of social upheaval allow democratic institutions to showcase their flexibility
by self-correcting the disparities between public expectations of institutional performance
and the actual performance of said institutions and showcase an ability to manage
conflicts between cleavages in the society. Miller’s study differentiates short-term and
long-term distrust in government, arguing that they are separate problems with a different
set of remedies. He argues that short-run dissatisfaction with the government polices can
9

Miller, page 951
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erode trust in democratic institutions, but can be remedied by something as basic as a
wave election in which “the rascals are thrown out”, and presumably replaced by
representatives with policy preferences that are more congruent with those of the majority
of he public. However, Miller argues that long-term discontent with governmental
institutions likely indicates the presence of deeply-rooted resentment in the society
between social cleavages, coupled with a pervasive notion amongst some groups in the
society that government does not work for their benefit. Miller states that these groups
over time tend to develop a sense of hostility toward both elected officials and
governmental institutions that cannot be ameliorated by simply “voting the bums out”.
He argues that societies that experience a prolonged period of political malaise may be
characterized by political systems that are unable to manage societal conflict in a fully
operative manner.10

Holes in the Literature:
There are still considerable holes in our understanding of institutional trust, and I
argue that scholars to date have paid scant attention of trust levels in the European Union.
To date, most work has focused on levels of trust in one institution within the EU, rather
than employ a holistic approach that examines the trust levels in the entire EU. The debt
crisis in several member states that use the Euro as their currency clearly represents a
case in which the European Union failed to enforce rules that it had on the books
pertaining to the caps it had placed on debt and deficit levels, and its failure to do so
could have significant consequences for other member states that followed the rules. A
debate rages on in the literature of how to classify the European Union and how to think
10

Miller, page 951
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of the power balance between the sui generis EU and its member states. However, what
is lost in the debate is European citizens’ perceptions of the EU and its capacity to mange
external and internal pressures that have previously been dealt with by the state. I argue
that perception that the European Union is capable of withstanding globalization
pressures and managing internal conflicts will be an important factor in determining
whether or not a citizen trusts the European Union.
Additionally, debate over the democratic deficit in the European Union has been
occurring since the days of the European Coal and Steel Community. Since the 1950’s,
scholars and statesmen alike have been grappling with the need to balance the desire for
greater cooperation and coordination at the continent level with the ability of citizens to
hold supranational Europe accountable. The EU has long been vulnerable to criticisms of
the democratic deficit but integrationists have sought to ameliorate this concern by
consistently strengthening the role of the European Parliament, the only democratically
elected branch of the EU government. With the switch from the cooperation to codecision procedure as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament secured
a true check over the legislative process, as the co-decision procedure ensured that the
Council and European Parliament must both pass identical versions of the same bill.
Subsequent treaties such as Nice and Lisbon have strengthened the role of the EP even
further, particularly Lisbon which granted the European Parliament control over the
entire EU budget and the now defunct third pillar of cooperation in Justice and Home
Affairs.11 Nevertheless, the Irish voters have rejected both Nice and Lisbon in referenda
(and subsequently voted for them) which clearly could be taken as a rejection of the

11
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terms to which they can influence the European Union. What I mean by this, is that if
one believes that strengthening the European Parliament is a mechanism designed to
combat the democratic deficit in the European Union, Irish voters’ rejection of Lisbon
and Nice can be taken as a clear signal that this attempt to address the democratic deficit
is inadequate. In this dissertation, I will examine the effect the perceived democracy
deficit in the European Union has on levels of trust, expecting to find that individuals
who perceive a democracy deficit will be less likely to trust the EU than their
counterparts who do not perceive a democracy deficit.

Layout of the Dissertation:
In chapter 1, I examine the integration process. Majone (2009) argues that
proponents of integration have resorted to a strategy of “integration by stealth” in order to
achieve greater levels of integration in a political environment where many citizens in the
member states are reticent to transfer sovereignty to the supranational European Union.
Majone states that integrationists have pushed economic integration as a means to
achieve political integration, however he believes the EU is still lacking in regard to the
latter. In Chapter 1, I find considerable support for Majone’s argument, and discuss how
the lack of political integration has generated suboptimal results in two important policy
domains: the European Monetary Union (EMU) and Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP).
The next two chapters focus on different aspects of the democratic deficit in the
European Union. In chapter 2, I discuss the varying ways in which scholars have
approached the perception of a democratic deficit in the European Union. This chapter
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fits into the institutionalist approach to studying the democratic deficit, but unlike most
studies, is not focused upon the debate over the role of the European Parliament. Instead,
I employ an analysis of how prominent members of the Council have handled the
sovereign debt crisis to support my claim that citizens in member states such as Greece
have lost a degree of political efficacy as a result of their country’s membership in the
European Monetary Union.
In chapter 3, I will examine the referenda process in the European Union. Many
member state constitutions make a referendum necessary in order for the government to
enter into a treaty or broaden the powers of the European Union. Thus, the referendum
process, on paper, gives the citizens in the member states a clear opportunity to exert
their will on the EU by either approving or rejecting changes. Nevertheless, while “yes’
votes are decisive and followed by increasing levels of integration, “no” votes are
normally followed by a second referendum or parliamentary tactic to bypass the
electorate altogether to secure the changes. I argue that the referendum process is clearly
slanted in favor of proponents of integration, and this raises serious concerns about the
democratic deficit of the EU.
In chapter 4, I test the effect that the concepts I discuss in the first three chapters
have on the trust citizens have in the European Union. As a measure for the lack of
political integration I describe in Chapter 1, I use a survey question asked by
Eurobarometer 71.3 as an independent variable to predict trust levels. The
Eurobarometer asks respondents: “to what extent do you think the EU has the tools
necessary to defend our interests in a globalized world.” Additionally, I use the response
to the statement “my voice counts in the European Union” as a proxy measure for the
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perception of a democratic deficit in the European Union. I find that both of these
variables have a significant impact on the level of trust respondents report having in the
European Union. I have controlled for traditional variables such as age, ideology,
whether or not one is from an original 6 country, knowledge of the functioning of the EU,
and trust in the domestic parliament.
In chapter 5, I will discuss the concept of identity in the European Union.
Cultivating a sense of identity amongst the people any political entity represents is
regarded in Norris (2011) as achieving the most diffuse support a regime can attain.
However the concept of identity is so murky, particularly for the supranational European
Union which is constantly in flux. In chapter 5, I reveal which attributes European Union
citizens report as integral features of a European identity, and discuss how an emerging
sense of transnational identity may help the EU withstand perceived shortcomings in its
outputs.
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Chapter 1: “Integration by Stealth”12
Introduction:
On April 27th, 2010, Standard and Poor’s downgraded the debt owed by the Greek
government to junk status; an overt signal to foreign investors that lending money to the
Greek government was a futile endeavor. One of the fastest growing economies in the
first decade of the 20th century, Greece stood at a point of no return in the spring of 2010
if the government failed to address the massive budget deficits that threatened to both
reverse the economic progress the country had made in the prior two decades and sever
Greece’s economic interdependence with the European Union. For other countries in the
European Monetary Union, the Greek financial crisis meant having to face a decision
between an expensive bailout of a foreign government, or risk the devaluation of the
Euro, the common currency for all the countries in the monetary union.
The sudden deterioration of Greece’s financial situation caused immediate
concern in all corners of the Eurozone, and financial experts began to discuss the options
the European Union had in regard to its response to the Greek financial crisis. There was
broad consensus that the EU would have to act quickly in order to prevent the Greek
crisis from worsening, and jeopardizing the value of the Euro. Additionally, other
countries within the monetary union such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland were also facing
large enough budget deficits that economic leaders feared that their financial situations
could soon resemble the Greek crisis if not addressed. Nevertheless, there was
considerable opposition to an expensive bailout package in other EU countries,
particularly because most European economies were still recovering from the American
financial crisis the previous year. Additionally, others wondered how the safeguards that
12
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the monetary union members had insisted upon had failed to prevent a crisis like Greece
faced early in 2010.
Following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Germans insisted on strict
criteria for membership into the European Monetary Union. Then foreign minister
Theodor Waigel clearly articulated the Kohl government’s position that low inflation
rates and fiscal discipline were responsible for the economic growth Germany had
experienced since World War II, and that these principles would have to be at the core of
Eurozone monetary and fiscal policy if the Euro was to be competitive with foreign
currencies. To ensure this, the Germans led the negotiations for the Stability and Growth
Pact which required Eurozone member states to keep budget deficits from exceeding 3%
of GDP, maintain low inflation rates, and a national debt that was less than 60% of
GDP.13 In order to ensure compliance, the Stability and Growth Pact stated that a
country could be fined up to 0.5% of it GDP and face other consequences if the country
failed to comply with the pact’s regulations. Nevertheless, less than two years after the
creation of the Euro, Germany and France both found themselves on the brink of budget
deficits that exceeded 3% of GDP.14 By 2009, there were nearly a dozen instances of
Eurozone member-states running a budget deficit beyond the 3% of GDP threshold.
Additionally, five member states had debt levels that exceeded the 60% of GDP mark
agreed upon in the Growth and Stability Pact, including Greece, Belgium, and Italy
which all have national debt levels that are greater than 90% of their GDP.15
The failure of member-states to comply with the provisions put forth by the
Growth and Stability Pact can be interpreted many different ways, but at a baseline it is
13
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clear that there has been considerable noncompliance with the standards that were
initially put forth as essential for participation in the monetary union. Proponents of a
single currency recognized early on that a common currency posed a considerable
collective action problem, but their concerns were partially ameliorated by generally
successful implementation of the convergence criteria in the 1990’s.16 However, as early
as 2003, both the French and the Germans, two leading countries in the European Union,
were on the brink of violating the rule that budget deficits not exceed 3% of GDP. The
German governing coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens had a tenuous hold
on power in 2003 as Germany economic growth had slowed and opinion polls began to
show support for the policies of Chancellor Schroeder and his coalition government on
the decline five years after the SPD had recaptured control of the Bundestag after a
decade and a half hiatus. Chancellor Schroder found himself in a difficult political
balancing act; maintaining the support of his center-left-left coalition while garnering
some support from the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) who controlled the Bundesrat,
Germany’s relatively powerful upper house that can block legislation that effects the
Lander.17 Schroder calculated that his government would have to follow through on a
promise to cut income taxes in order to advance the rest of his economic agenda in a
tough political environment. The problem Schroder and his government faced was that
economic forecast revisions showed Germany to be dangerously close to running a
budget deficit that surpassed the 3% threshold in the stability pact. Nevertheless,
Schroder decided to appease national concerns first, and to deal with the repercussions

16
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from Europe if they should come. The Schroder government cut income taxes and
became one of two member states to break the rules of the Growth and Stability Pact.18
By the end of 2003, it was clear that the Germans would not be alone in
exceeding the budget deficit threshold established by the stability pact. The French were
projecting a 4.2% of GDP deficit for 2003, and EU projections showed that their deficit
would be close to 4% in 2004 as well.19 The Economic and Finance Affairs Council
(Ecofin) announced that France was not in compliance with the Stability and Growth
Pact, and the Commission favored pursuing action against the French. Nevertheless, the
Germans led by then German Finance Ministers Hans Eichel, supported the French and
argued that the fines set forth by the stability pact were only intended for countries that
“did not cooperate.”20 Eichel went on to argue that so long as a member state came to the
table to discuss budgetary issues, the state should be deemed as cooperative with the
European Union. Eichel’s attempt to change the definition of compliance with an EU
directive underscores the problem the European Union faces: How can the European
Union enforce member-state compliance with EU directives?
My argument is that the current institutions are incapable of generating optimal
results because the Europeans have cut corners in their institutional development that
have undermined the European Union’s ability to take the lead in managing a crisis.
Setbacks at the ballot box have slowed the integration process, as voters in member state
such as Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Ireland have disrupted the integration
process at various stages and at points have forced integrationists to jettison deeper
integration such as the European Constitution in lieu of more modest proposals such as
18
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the Treaty of Lisbon. (See Chapter 3) A reluctant citizenry has inhibited the most ardent
supporters of integration from crafting the central institutions that would facilitate the
European Union acting in a manner that would resemble American-style federalism.
However, resistance to the integration process has not solely come from the
people, but often times from the governments of the member states as well. Notable
scholars such as J.F. Kover, Stanley Hoffman, and Andrew Moravcsik have all written
about the delicate balancing act of transferring sovereignty in some domains to
supranational Europe while preserving the important role of the traditional state. The
intergovernmentalist school of thought regarding supranational Europe correctly argued
that states would be unwilling to transfer sovereignty in “high politics” domains such as
foreign policy and defense because doing so would leave the state vulnerable in one of its
key functions, which is to protect its citizenry in an anarchical world.21
However, it has not just been in the realm of foreign policy and defense that states
have been reluctant to fully transfer sovereignty, but in key areas where they have started
integration but not fully seen it through like with the euro. The Maastricht Treaty paved
the way for the establishment of the euro, and member states wishing to take part
undertook the process of reducing their budget deficits and following the convergence
criteria that Maastricht had established to facilitate the transition from a dozen different
currencies toward a common one. While there was some grumbling about prices being
rounded up as disparate state currencies transitioned to the euro, many economists and
politicians praised the relatively seamless transition back in 2002.
By 2009, however, it was clear that there were structural problems that the
monetary union was struggling to cope with. High deficit and national debt levels in
21
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Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy prompted higher borrowing costs for those
countries, which in turn exacerbated their respective debt crises and raised the likelihood
that a member of the eurozone would default on its loans. Additionally, European Union
institutions appeared impotent in their response to the crisis, with no one branch
possessing the credibility or gravitas to step up and take the lead in managing the
problem at the European Union level. With EU institutions seemingly paralyzed and
lacking the authority to make tough decisions that could be imposed on the member
states, much of the EU response in fact was merely intergovernmental negotiations
between member states, specifically Germany and France. The unwillingness of charter
members of supranational Europe to allow European Union institutions to take the lead in
managing the crisis can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the Germans and
French may believe that the institutions of the European Union are incapable of
developing a solution to the problem, and therefore are intervening to manage the crisis
in a manner the European Union cannot. On the other hand, the French and Germans
may believe that institutions like the European Central Bank have the tools necessary to
manage the crisis, but are unwilling to cede the authority to manage the crisis to EU
institutions that are out of their control. Regardless of the rationale of the French and
German leaders, the result is the same: a European Union that lacks the economic and
political integration of a traditional state. The relationship between trust in the European
Union and belief in its capacity to manage a crisis is undoubtedly correlated and perhaps
tautologically inseparable. Citizens and member states will not likely agree to transfer
new powers to a supranational entity that they perceive as incapable of managing their
interests. However, failure to fully empower the European Union ultimately will result in
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a self-fulfilling prophecy as failure to craft institutions that have the authority to craft
solutions to complex problems and enforce compliance with those decisions will
undoubtedly result in institutions that produce sub optimal policy results, particularly in
times of crisis.
Nevertheless, I argue that this is the reality the European Union finds itself in.
The federalist “United States of Europe” model that Jean Monnet envisioned for the
continent was long ago jettisoned in lieu of more modest integration levels. Despite the
challenges they have faced, the integrationists have continued to fight for greater
integration in the face of setbacks at the ballot box and reticent member states who resist
letting the EU institutions take the leading role in times of crisis. Specifically, the
integrationists have sought economic integration as a means to political integration in
attempt to bypass all the political obstacles that stand in the way of a politicallyintegrated European Union. The result of this “integration by stealth” strategy is
underdeveloped, hastily thrown together institutions that do not have the capacity to
manage European interests in a globalized world, or Giandomenico Majone’s name for it
“cryptofederalism”22

Literature Review:
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe revealed the euro was badly put together and
that the European Union lacked the political oversight necessary to obtain optimal
monetary policy. However, in order to understand the contemporary institutional
framework, it is necessary to re-visit the integration process and how it resulted in the
contemporary status quo.
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The early political and scholarly debates regarding supranational Europe focused
primarily on the balance of power between Europe and the traditional nation-state. Jean
Monnet, often considered the father of modern Europe, often spoke of the continent as
“The United States of Europe” and was very much interested in emulating Americanstyle federalism as a model for supranational Europe. Alitero Spinelli, perhaps the most
consistent advocate for importing American-style federalism to Europe, fundamentally
believed that it was impossible for Europe to rebuild a democratic and prosperous society
without the direction of a supranational authority.23 For Spinelli, the nation-states were
ill-equipped to tackle the political, economic, and security challenges the continent faced
in the aftermath of the war such as national security in the bipolar world, the German
question, and Spinelli and many other prominent federalists believed that the member
states of Europe faced a simple choice: federate or perish.

JF Kover (1954) arguing the

need for Europe to unite or fade into obscurity expressed his frustration with the
intransigence of the states, lamenting that they “fiercely guard their security as if their life
depended on it.” The same year of Kover’s piece, the European Defence Community
was defeated in the French Parliament, a stunning defeat for Europeanization process that
had been steadily gaining steam since the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1951.
While leading proponents of integration favored a federalist model in which the
European government would share powers with the nation-states, the defeat of The EDC
indicated that an American-style federalist model for Europe was unlikely to come to
fruition. Nevertheless, early proponents of the functionalist model for integration
believed that there was still a need for integration in policy domains that the states were
23
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perceived to be addressing in sub-optimal fashion. David Mitrany (1946) believed that
supranational Europe could concentrate on “joint performance of a specific task,”
indicating his belief that a happy medium could be created between autonomous nationstates who could have it both ways by maintaining their sovereignty while still
cooperating in policy domains whose optimal solutions required more than just action
from the nation-state. Ernst Haas (1958) amended Mitrany’s thesis by adding the concept
of spillover effects occurring as a result of integration in certain areas. For Haas, a
situation in which integration occurred in specific policy domains would almost certainly
lead to more integration in others, as “spillovers” would occur that would require
cooperation into new policy domains.
Notable intergovernmentalists believed that the functionalist approach as
represented by Mitrany and the neo-functionalist approach of Haas underestimated the
extent to which states would protect their sovereignty. Stanley Hoffman (1966)
maintained that states may transfer some sovereignty in “low politics” domains such as
trade and agricultural policy, but would fiercely guard their sovereignty in “high politics”
domains such as foreign policy and national security. Andrew Moravcsik (1994) argues
that states will be selective regarding the areas they seek integration, agreeing to
transferring power to a higher authority only when it is in their best interest to do so.
Giandomenico Majone (2009) offers an interesting take on integration that I think
best represents what actually has occurred to this point. Majone argues that prominent
advocates of integration such as Jean Monnet fiercely advocated the concept of
supranational Europe to the point that the end result ultimately became a secondary goal
to the movement itself. Majone cites the work of Alan Milward (1992) who interviewed
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Paul-Henri Spaak, a Belgian statesman, who related to Milward that “everything that
tends to European organizations was good.” Majone refers to these people as
“cryptofederalists,” and he thinks of them as proponents of a federalized system who
understand the political constraints to achieving their vision for Europe, and therefore
seek intermediate goals in order to advance their cause the best they can in a hostile
political environment.24 In the words of Milward, for these people, “any form of
integration, any common authority in Western Europe, had become the indispensable
guarantee for post-war security, and he (Spaak the Belgian foreign minister) became
increasingly indifferent to what that authority might be or do.”25
Majone goes on to argue that Monnet was astutely aware that integration in the
European Coal and Steel Community was likely to have an impact beyond the industrial
sector, and force the hands of member states to seek more cooperation in non coal and
steel sectors of the economy in order to maintain the viability of the first organization.
Majone believes that Monnet and the early functionalists were quick to write the epitaph
of the nation-state, and naïve to think that limited integration in the industrial sector of
the various economies would ultimately lead to broader economic integration and
political integration- at least the political integration that had the capacity and legitimacy
to act quickly and decisively in key moments. The hastily thrown together political
integration of Europe, according to Majone, is a direct result of a crytofederalist strategy
to “integrate by stealth,” in order to avoid having to win over popular support and attain
political integration by cultivating conducive public opinion and winning elections.26
The integration by stealth strategy has consequences though: including contributing to
24
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the perception of a democracy deficit (which I will discuss in Chapter 2) and creating
political institutions that lack the capabilities to enact optimal policies.

The United States of Europe?
Americans often forget that our contemporary union does not resemble the
framework established by our original attempt at republican government, the Articles of
Confederation. In the early days of our republic, people generally did not view
themselves as “American” per se, but rather as New Yorkers, Virginians, or South
Carolinians. True power in those days was vested in state legislatures, each of whom
fiercely guarded their power to the point that the federal government was relegated to a
secondary role in governing the country.
The founding fathers who attended the constitutional convention in Philadelphia
understood that a unified country could not exist with an institutional framework of 13
sovereign governments and an absence of a federal authority. Still, each state had some
common similarities: including a common language, a legal code based in English
common law, and state governments that were built around a similar institutional design.
Walter Lippmann (1943) famously argued that the thirteen states “were not forming an
altogether unprecedented union, they were perpetuating and perfecting a union which had
always existed since the plantation of British colonies in North America.”27
Jean Monnet used to speak of the “United States of Europe,” which was as much
a tribute to the United States, a country he greatly admired, as a prescription for Europe’s
collective future. Notable federalists of his time period like Altiero Spinelli believed the
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continent faced a simple choice in the aftermath of World War II: federate or perish.28
The school of thought, at the time, believed that the problems the post-war continent
faced were on of too large a magnitude to be solved by domestic governments. Spinelli
and the other federalists understood that the world had changed as a result of the war, and
that in order for Europe to remain a relevant force in the world, it would need a strong
supranational state and an integrated security force. The most ardent federalists believed
that the traditional states would be too feeble to retain their traditional legitimacy in the
aftermath of the war, and this would allow Europe an opportunity to craft new institutions
on a clean slate.29
Nevertheless, the more moderate integrationists understood that there would be a
short window for implementation and resistance from the masses who would cling to
their traditional national identity. By 1946, it was clear that the traditional states were
persevering, and the federalists’ idea that they would simply slither away were not
coming to fruition.30 Still, there was a high point for supranational Europe in 1951 with
the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and subsequent European
Political Community in 1953. Scholars such as Gillingham (1993) have downplayed the
economic significance of the European Coal and Steel Community, but it undoubtedly is
a milestone in the development of supranational Europe for its creation of a supranational
authority over the member states. Contemporary institutions such as the European Court
of Justice are the byproduct of the European Coal and Steel Community.
However, the federalists view the early 1950s as a period of lost opportunity, as
the logical extension to the European Coal and Steel Community and European Political
28
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Community, the European Defence Community (EDC), stalled in the French Parliament
in 1954. With the stunning defeat of the EDC in Paris (which was nevertheless met with
considerable relief in Bonn, Rome, and London) the framework for the European
Political Community collapsed, and the project stagnated until the late 1980’s and the
ratification of the Single European Act in 1987.
The Single European Act (SEA) reinvigorated the Europeanization process that
had by in large stagnated since 1954, with the exception of enlargement in the early
1970’s which brought Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark into the fold. The
SEA sought to move Europe toward a single market, a vision many of Europe’s leaders
had in the 1950’s, but had never been realized. The SEA paved the way for the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which created the three pillars of the European Union: the
traditional economic, environmental, and human rights involvement of the European
Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home
Affairs. Additionally, the Maastricht Treaty established the member state’s commitment
to forming a single currency in 10 years; a development the integrationists believed
would put the project at a point of no return.
The early 1990’s was undoubtedly another window for integration as the fall of
communism in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union ushered in a new
opportunity for Europe to re-assert itself in the international system. The Maastricht
Treaty represented both broadening of EU authority into new policy domains and
deepening of integration in others. The proposed creation of the euro was seen as the
pinnacle of economic integration, the culmination of a decades-long pursuit for a single
European market. In addition to the first pillar which represented the traditional
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involvement of the European Community, the Europeans hoped to develop a Common
Foreign and Security Policy at the European level in hopes of offering an alternative to
American hegemony, particularly in Western Europe, Central and Eastern European
countries, and the rest of the neighborhood that included parts of North Africa, Ukraine,
and the Middle East.
While both the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the CFSP were ambitious
goals, pursued in earnest by many statesmen, they are both showing signs of falling apart
just two decades after being established by the Maastricht Treaty. I argue that
integrationists rushed the political development of both of these institutions in order to hit
a political window that they understood would close just as it had in the mid 1950’s. The
integration by stealth strategy, as Majone calls it, has led to a European Union that on
paper has considerable power to exert its will over the member states and defend the
interests of their citizens. However, the reality is that recent events such as the sovereign
debt crisis have revealed the monetary union is a tenuous relationship between disparate
member states that lacks the overarching political authority that could make it function in
a more harmonious fashion. The CFSP has performed even worse, as the Iraq War and
Libyan intervention revealed prominent schisms that indicate there is no common vision
for European foreign policy at all.
Majone sums it up best: “The Euro elites have consistently followed the strategy
of first expanding the powers of the Union, and only later trying to find the requisite
normative resources. The problem is that the EU’s expanding policy commitments…are
insolvent, being unsupported by sufficient normative and political resources.”31
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The Troubled EMU:
The European Monetary Union (EMU) is perhaps the best example of this we
have to date. Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, had pushed for a single currency in the
wake of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.32 While the primary purpose of the
Treaty of Rome was creation of a single market, there was considerable worry about the
effect exchange rates would have on trade from one country to the next, particularly in
regard to agriculture. There were renewed calls for monetary integration the late 1970’s
and 1980’s, but the uncertainty of the European economies due to stagflation and spiking
energy prices made the pursuit of a single currency in those days a futile endeavor. It
was not until Maastricht in 1992 that the EU would get the political agreement for the
single currency.
Many economists had predicted from the onset that the economic benefits of the
EMU would be relatively modest. In 1992, the distinguished American economist and
Harvard professor Martin Feldstein wrote an opinion piece that was published in The
Economist called “the Case Against EMU.” In his prescient editorial, Feldstein argued
that the Europeans were rushing to create a single currency without giving serious
thought to what some of the potential drawbacks that would certainly alter the costbenefit calculus for creating a common currency.
To start with the benefits, Feldstein states that one of the most prominently cited
reasons given for the move to the single currency is the elimination of transaction costs
associated with converting once currency to another. With the elimination of these
transaction costs, and the short-run shocks of fluctuating currencies, it was argued that
32
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the euro would provide greater stability for the free flow of goods, services, and capital
from one member state to the next. That being said, Feldstein argued that fluctuations in
currencies have not necessarily been an inhibitor to trade, and he cites volatile swings in
the dollar throughout the 1980’s that had little impact on foreign trade as empirical
evidence for his claim.33 Additionally, he asserts that fluctuations that occur in the
market can help a member state, and eliminating those fluctuations can actually reduce
trade.34 In sum, Feldstein believed in 1992 that the Europeans did not require a single
currency to promote trade, and pointed to the strong, interdependent economic
relationship between the United States and Canada to make his case.
The second prediction was more dire, and has been a prominent problem in the
aftermath of the global recession and subsequent economic downturn. Feldstein’s piece
argued that the creation of the single currency would eliminate the member state
governments’ control of monetary policy, something he believed would be necessary for
managing a crisis.
In the final paragraph of his editorial (preceded with the sub heading “think
again,” Feldstein captures what was happening perfectly. He argues that the true
motives behind creation of the monetary union are not economic, but political. Feldstein
argued that the proponents of the EMU had an agenda to transfer decision making over
the monetary union away from national capitals and toward Brussels.35 Perhaps the only
part of his argument he got wrong was his suggestion that this would inevitably lead to a
federalist style of decision making at the supranational level that enjoyed more political
control.
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20 years after it was written, the Feldstein piece is continuing to garner attention
for its prescience in predicting what the economic outcome would be of crafting the
single currency. However, the corresponding political integration and the federalist
model of decision making based in Brussels never came to fruition. The Germans
insisted in the early days on the Growth and Stability Pact which would set strict limits
for deficits (3% of GDP) and national debt levels (60% of GDP). Three years into the
monetary union, the Germans became the first to break the rule, in order for Gerhard
Schroder and his government (facing a tough re-election challenge from the resurgent
CDU/CSU led by Angela Merkel) to make good on a tax break they had promised to the
voters. The French followed suit the same year, but neither was punished with the 0.5%
of GDP fine the Growth and Stability Pact mandated. Additionally, while ECOFIN
reported the French in violation of the Growth and Stability Pact, the Germans sheltered
them from action by the Commission, creating a scenario in which the largest two
economies in the Eurozone formed an alliance against punishment for their respective
countries breaking the rules. The later part of the decade saw more member states
identified as rule breakers, but by that point the Growth and Stability Pact was weakened
and the precedent had already been set that no punishment would be levied for failure to
comply.
The Troubled Euro Looks East:
For the advocates of integration, the EMU was the logical extension of the
creation of a single market, and a culmination of a decades-long process of integration
efforts that was perhaps now at a point of no-return. Nevertheless, the European Union
in 2011 has perhaps found itself overextended as a result of simultaneous expansion of
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the European Union into Central and Eastern Europe and the deepening of integration as
represented by the EMU. Majone argues that the EMU, celebrated as the high point of
European integration, perhaps has effectively split the Union into two or three different
factions: members of the monetary union, dejure and defacto opt outs, and member states
that will have to leave the monetary union.36
While the future of the EMU and the impact it will have on the future of the
European Union are still unknown, what we do know is that the EMU was badly put
together, as it was characterized by economic integration without the necessary political
integration to regulate it. In November of 2005, the current Prime Minister of Italy and
well-respected monetary economist Mario Monti told the Italian financial newspaper
Sole-24 that the euro is a currency in search of a single market, and that the single-market
was not fully realized before the creation of the euro as states continued to put up
barriers.37 Additionally, while the single currency was initially deemed as an attractive
mechanism for increasing intra-European trade by reducing transaction costs, the
overvaluation of the euro as compared to the dollar and yuan have made American and
Chinese exports to Europe more attractive to European consumers.38
The uncertainty over the future of the EMU has additionally inhibited the
European Union’s ability to craft a more aggressive external monetary policy. As the
deficit crises in the United States continues, many economists and speculators are
convinced that the United States will ultimately have to reduce the value of the dollar in
order to have an easier time paying back the money. In 2010, the Chinese sold off tens of
billions of dollars worth of U.S. treasury bonds, a move that indicated clear frustration
36
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with American economic management and some apprehension about the amount of
American debt the Chinese were holding.39 Zimmermann (2004) found that in order for
Europe to pursue a more assertive role in the international monetary system, the EU
would need to embark on a series of internal reforms, particularly liberalization of the
labor markets.40 Nevertheless, even with the rampant uncertainty surrounding American
economy, the size of the American debt in relation to GDP, and the ability of the dollar to
maintain its status as the primary reserve currency throughout the world, the euro has
been unable to increase its competitiveness with the dollar in terms of being a reserve
currency. Much of this can be attributed to the sovereign debt crisis of member states
such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, but there are still structural problems
with the currency itself.
What was initially supposed to be a monetary union of a few economically similar
and integrated countries expanded to including peripheral areas such as Greece and
Portugal, economies that seemingly have very little in common with France and
Germany. With the current eurozone membership at 17, each country with their own
different economic and political agenda, it is somewhat uncertain that the eurozone is an
optimal currency area. Additionally, the recent enlargements into East and Central
Europe were done in accordance with a policy of acquis communautaire- a criteria that
does not allow the new members to opt out of EMU policies, an option that was given to
the old EU members.41 While states such as Latvia and Bulgaria ostensibly have budget
deficits and national debt levels (in relation to GDP) that put them in compliance with the
guidelines set forth by the growth and stability pact. Nevertheless, Latvia has a per capita
39
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income of only 37% of the EU 15 average, and the average per capita income for all new
2005 and 2007 members is only around 40% of the EU 15.42 The comparable figure for
Greece, Portugal, and Spain when they joined the European Union was 65% of the
original 10 members. Majone nicely puts the disparity in per capita income between
Western and Eastern Europe in perspective: “This is about the same difference as that
between Western Europe and the United States in 1945, when the old continent was in
ruins while the economy of the physically intact America was booming.”43
However, if history is any indication, we can expect the EMU to try to absorb the
Central and Eastern countries, even before any potential pitfalls are critically examined.
The lesson from the monetary union is that integrationists will seek broadening,
deepening, and expansion as a means to achieve a goal toward greater integration, even
before the potential pitfalls are worked out. It is this do first, think later strategy that that
has frustrated not only opponents of integration, but also proponents who want the
process done the right way. (See Chapter: the slogan for the French “no” campaign over
the EU Constitution was “No to the constitution, yes to Europe) However, to do things
the right way, institutions have to be carefully crafted so that they may function as
planned and in time secure legitimacy of the people they represent. The “integration by
stealth” strategy of pursuing economic integration as a means to achieve political
integration ensures that the integrationists can temporarily get their desired outcomes, by
masking their true objectives with technical economic jargon that is not particularly
salient to most citizens. The reluctant citizenry (as will be discussed in Chapter 3) makes
integration more difficult, but by pursuing the integration by stealth strategy, proponents
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of integration perhaps have inadvertently done great damage to their ultimate objectives.
The poorly-crafted EMU with and its lack of political leadership has very much damaged
the perception of the euro, and this could have long-term consequences for the prospects
for integration, as the euro is its most important symbol. However, it is not just EMU
that is in trouble, recent events have cast doubt on the viability of the second biggest
symbolic European Union endeavor, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The sorry state of CFSP:
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the bipolar Cold War world,
Europe was afforded a new opportunity to assert itself on the world stage. The
Maastricht Treaty established Common Foreign and Security Policy as the Second Pillar
of the European Union., and this was hailed by many Europeans as an opportunity to
reclaim a prominent role in international security affairs.44
While the Clinton and Bush Administrations both encouraged the Europeans to
cooperate and take more control of their own security, many scholars expressed
reservation about what a united Europe would mean for international security. Jeffrey
Cimbalo (2004) argued that the CFSP was an attempt to “aggrandize power at the
expense of NATO, the foundation of transatlantic security for more than a half
century.”45 Samuel Huntington (1999) was even more demonstrative, asserting that the
coalescing of European power would be “the single most important reaction against US
hegemony that would lead to a “multipolar twenty-first century.”46
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Other scholars thought it beneficial to both Europe and the U.S. that the
Europeans craft a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moravcsik (2003) argued that
the Europeans can work cooperatively with NATO by each organization focusing on
performing a specific function (read EU addresses humanitarian crises while NATO
addresses problems militarily.)
For all the hoopla over CFSP, the results have been underwhelming to say the
least. The first test the CFSP faced was the breakup of the Yugoslavia, an event that led
to civil war and genocide on European soil in the 1990s’. With the Europeans failing to
intervene in a productive and decisive manner, the mission became NATO’s, and this
was met with considerable embarrassment amongst the European elites who had believed
earlier in the decade that the breakup of the Soviet Union provided Europe with a new
chance to assert its influence in the world.
However, if the Balkan conflict reflected badly on the state of CFSP, the Iraq war
was a disaster. In the lead up to the war, there was a pronounced division between the
United Kingdom whose Prime Minister Tony Blair supported the U.S.-led invasion, and
France and Germany whose leaders adamantly opposed it. While the division between
the continental power houses was the most documented, the division between east and
west was perhaps more revealing. Bush Administration officials regularly pointed out
the support that the war enjoyed in Eastern Europe, with Donald Rumsfeld going so far as
to call it “new Europe.” (as opposed to Western Europe the “old Europe”) While the
name calling may have been over the top, the fact that European Union’s new members
aligned themselves with American foreign policy rather than continental leaders France
and Germany is significant. However, the Central and Eastern European countries were
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generally very happy to be brought into the NATO fold, given the re-emergence of
Russia as a prominent global actor in the Putin era. These countries have undoubtedly
viewed their newly-formed alliances with the United States as a deterrence against Russia
overstepping its boundaries in the region.
The disparate views over the Iraq War revealed the difficulty of crafting a
singular foreign policy between over two dozen different states. Just as with the
eurozone, the European Union was clearly divided into three camps: those who
supported the invasion, those who opposed, and neutral states who generally stay out of
such matters. Still, the proponents of CFSP like Javier Solona continued to press for
greater military expenditures from EU member states and better coordination of policy at
the supranational level.
The 2011 events in Libya were perhaps the nail in the coffin for CFSP, however.
In early March 2011, leaders from the United Kingdom and France began to clamor for
the establishment of a “no-fly” zone over Libya, in an attempt to convince the divided
Obama Administration it was time to intervene. The democratization protests in Libya,
loosely associated with a broader series of protests collectively known as the Arab
Spring, had quickly descended into civil war in Libya. European Union leaders publicly
fretted over the idea of another massacre in a neighboring EU state, as many still had
vivid memories of the European Union’s ineffectual response to the ethnic cleansing that
occurred in the Balkans in the late 1990’s. Additionally, by the end of March of 2011, a
variety of European institutions had already assisted in the evacuation of over 100,000
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refugees attempting to flee Libya in what quickly was becoming a large-scale
humanitarian disaster.47
While ultimately successful in lobbying the Obama Administration to agree to a
NATO-led no-fly zone over Libya, the political ramifications were significant. On the
one hand, outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates chastised the Europeans for not
having the sufficient resources to be an effective partner in the NATO mission. However,
criticism of Europe’s handling of the crisis in Libya was hardly coming from the
Americans alone. While Britain, France, and the United States lobbied for U.N. support
for the creation of a NATO-enforced no fly zone, many Europeans were left to wonder
why Britain and France would elect not to act within the institutional framework of the
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). “The CFSP died in
Libya- we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it,” one frustrated
source quipped to the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet.48 The 2009 Treaty of
Lisbon attempted to strengthen the CFSP by eliminating Maastricht’s pillar system that
compartmentalized EU policies and limited the scope of EU institutions to clearlydefined policy domains. The Lisbon Treaty reads that CFSP should, “cover all parts of
the EU’s foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union, including the
development of a common defense policy that can lead to a common defense.”
Nevertheless, in the midst of a rapidly-developing humanitarian crisis, France and
the U.K. chose to respond in the context of the American-led NATO rather than the
European Union’s recently strengthened CFSP. While the U.K.’s preference for NATO
surprised nobody, the French decision to act within the NATO framework reveals their
47
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reservations about the capacity of the EU to respond quickly and effectively to an
emerging threat to security or humanitarian crisis. Critics of American foreign policy for
decades, the French have had a long, complicated relationship with NATO that
culminated in their decades-long pursuit of developing a European security organization
capable of rivaling NATO’s ability to advance a security agenda on the world stage.
Nevertheless, with the humanitarian crisis worsening by the day in Libya, the French
understood that NATO was better-equipped to respond to rapidly-unfolding
developments on the ground. In a carefully-worded statement at the celebration of
France’s Bastille Day, French President Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to reconcile the
French decision to work within a NATO framework while maintaining support for a
viable CFSP: “The basis for a European defense exists. We must make it grow.” The
French President went on to say, “I want Europe to be capable of ensuring its security
autonomously.”
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Nevertheless, the European response to Libya showcased two familiar
shortcomings in the European Union’s response to global events that have cast doubt on
the future viability of CFSP. Similar to Iraq nearly a decade before, the major European
powers were once again unable to craft a singular vision of foreign policy. While the
United Kingdom and France were the most vocal advocates of the creation of the no fly
zone over Libya, Germany was generally opposed to military intervention in Libya.
However, the most serious limitation to the European Union’s ability to promulgate a
common foreign policy, even if one existed, is the capacity of the EU to act in a quick
and decisive manner. When the NATO mission began in Libya, the first stage of the
operation was to establish a patrol in the Mediterranean Sea to enforce the arms embargo
49
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against Gaddafi’s regime. NATO was able to get started with this mission within 5 days,
an accomplishment that one supporter of CFSP conceded would have been impossible for
the European Union. “We (EU) could have done that, but the truth is that we had tried it
would probably take three months to even stick with an operational plan,” the EU
diplomat told the German news agency DPA.50
Thus, another institution of the European Union that got its start with the
Maastricht Treaty is in jeopardy just 20 years after coming to fruition. While the
potential certainly exists for greater coordination of foreign policy at the EU level, the
world where Europe emerges as a threat to American military hegemony is not close to
becoming a reality. The lesson is that true integration comes from entities that share a
common vision and a mutually-agreed upon path to take. Until the various member
states can agree on what the common foreign policy should be (let alone the tougher task
of determining how to get there) the CFSP is just a façade, and by no means a true
institution that is ready to take the lead in promulgating the citizens of Europe’s views on
foreign affairs.

Conclusion:
The integration process matters in terms of crafting political institutions that have
the capabilities to perform the functions they are assigned. While there have been
windows a which the strongest proponents of integrated Europe have been able to make
strides toward their vision, their often hasty and haphazard approach has left the
institutions they created with serious shortcomings that I argue will have deleterious
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consequences on the trust levels European citizens have in the institutions of the
European Union.
The process of integration has been tough, particularly since the end of the socalled permissive consensus in the early 1970’s (discussed in Chapter 3). However,
pursuing the integration by stealth strategy of pursuing economic integration as a means
to political integration has resulted in institutions that lack the capability to manage the
complex issues the European Union faces. In taking short cuts to get around the check of
a skeptical public, the integrationists have perhaps done more harm to their vision than
the opponents of integration have. If large symbols of European integration such as the
euro or CFSP fail, what will be the perception of the project going forward? Will the
strongest proponents of integration ever be able sell the public on the rest of their vision?
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“The Greek verb agorevo means ‘I speak in public.’ But agora also is the market. The
market was an area of politics. When you try to separate the two, as neoliberalism does,
trying to create a purely economic market place, then there is no democratic control. 51

Chapter 2: A Deficit of Democracy?
Introduction:
It’s June 28th, 2011, and union members and other protestors are gathered in
Syntagma Square to protest the slowing economy and new round of austerity measures
introduced by the government. Most people expect the parliament to adopt the new
round of austerity measures, defying opinion polls which suggest roughly 7 in 10 citizens
oppose them. Protests have been occurring for over a month at this point, but the next 48
hours will see some of the largest and most violent since the crisis began. There are
clashes with riot police, who are trying to disperse the crowd by driving through it on
motorcycles and firing tear gas and stun grenades.52 Additionally, vandalism and looting
of local shops are taking their toll on the weary citizens of the city. One distraught shop
owner tells a journalist, “there is no point to living in this country anymore,” as he
surveys the damage the looters have caused. By the end of the 48 hour strike, there will
be hundreds of people injured, and over 500,000 euro damage done to the city’s historic
center.
The aforementioned scene was not in Egypt, Tunisia, or any other country that
saw large scale protests against authoritarian governments in what would come to be
known as the 2011 Arab Spring. The protests I described were in Greece, and they were
the byproduct of a frustrated citizenry who was suffering as a result of the worst
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economic crisis the country had faced since democratization in the early 1970’s. The
situation in Greece seemed utterly hopeless in the summer of 2011. Following a decade
in which the country enjoyed the most rapid growth on the continent, the financial crisis
revealed major structural problems with the Greek economy that simply was not
productive or competitive enough to justify the high wages and generous pension and
other benefits the Greeks had become accustomed to. In 2010 alone, the Greek economy
contracted by 4.5%, and by mid-2011 the Greek economy was on pace to shrink by
another 4% that year as well. The corresponding unemployment rate was officially 16%,
but considerably higher amongst young workers.53
Exacerbating the problem, large public debt levels and membership in the euro
restricted the Greek government’s ability to employ fiscal and monetary tools such as a
stimulus or devaluing of the currency in order to make the crisis more manageable. With
debt levels at 150% of GDP and forecast to hit 166% of GDP the next year, the Greeks
were in no position to stimulate the economy through government spending. In fact, the
more likely scenario was that austerity measures to get deficit levels under control would
likely hinder the prospects for economic growth. However, the cost of borrowing for the
Greeks was skyrocketing to 7% in 2011 as investors insisted on high rates in order to
justify the risk of Greek bonds. In turn, the Greeks were spending 8-9% of their GDP on
just the interest payments for their debt.54
Monetary tools to combat the crisis were also unavailable, as membership in the
euro precluded the Greeks from taking measures such as weakening the currency to make
the debt more manageable. Additionally, the Germans resisted calls for the European
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Central Bank to sell Eurobonds which proponents say would have a stabling influence on
the crisis; and Chancellor Merkel cited concerns that public debt in member states such as
Greece or Italy would become debt the entire Eurozone was responsible for.55
The Greek government had considerably fewer tools at its disposal to manage its
financial crisis than the United States and other countries have had in the aftermath of the
worldwide recession that began in 2008. However, if the Greek government was
constrained, so too were Greek citizens, many of whom who felt that their voices were
not being heard as the Troika (European Commission, International Monetary Fund, and
European Central Bank) dictated to their democratically-elected government the terms by
which the Greek financial crisis was to be handled. As public opinion polls showed
widespread opposition to the austerity measures and Greeks crowded the streets to make
their voices heard, the Greek government led by Prime Minister George Papandreou
worked tirelessly to both appease those providing much- needed assistance and the Greek
public who was skeptical of the austerity measures Greece’s benefactors insisted upon.
One Greek woman interviewed by the Nation, vented her frustration by insisting that the
French and Germans would never impose the austerity measures they advocated for
Greece on their own people.56
This sentiment succinctly sums up the democratic deficit dilemma in the
European Union, particularly as it pertains to the sovereign debt crisis. How are Greek
people to exert their will over the process if their democratically-elected government is so
constrained by integration that it enters negotiations with its partners in too weak of a
position to represent the interests of the Greek people? What accountability do
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representatives of the European Central Bank, European Commission, and Council (read
more precisely German Chancellor and French President in the case of the sovereign debt
crisis response) have to the Greek people, and how can the Greek people have any sense
of political efficacy in a world where decisions are made for them by actors they cannot
remove from office?
The scholarship regarding the democracy deficit is diverse in scope and opinions
regarding the nature of democracy in the European Union. The predominant approach
for scholars who contribute to the democratic deficit literature is to examine the
institutional structure of the European Union. These studies are typically debating the
effect the EU has on the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches
in the member states. Additionally, many of the studies debate the extent to which
strengthening the European Parliament, the only democratically-elected branch of the
European Union, satisfies the democratic deficit concerns of EU critics. Other studies
examine how platform convergence of many domestic political parties limits the degree
to which the EU is a topic in the domestic political discourse. Finally, two prominent EU
scholars question whether there is a democratic deficit in the European Union at all.
In this chapter, I will be taking an institutional approach to examining the
democratic deficit in the European Union, however I am not focusing on the European
Parliament. My argument is that in regard to the sovereign debt crisis, two prominent
members of the Council have taken it upon themselves to manage the crisis, relegating
EU institutions to a secondary role.
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Literature Review:
The perception of a democratic deficit in the European Union has long been a
salient topic in the literature, particularly as there is only one component of the European
Union government that is democratically-elected in the member states, the European
Parliament. Scholars have provided varying interpretations of a perceived democratic
deficit in the European Union, but despite pleas from Weiler et. al (1995) have had little
success in establishing a standard definition of the concept. Follesdal and Hix (2006) is
one of the more complete studies of the perceived democratic deficit in the European
Union, and they address Weiler’s concern that studies focusing on the democratic deficit
in the European Union are too disjointed and lacking in conceptual clarity. Follesdal and
Hix provide an excellent account of the progression of the democratic deficit debate, and
have provided classifications for democratic deficit studies that represent the different
ways scholars have approached this topic.
The most typical argument in the literature examines the perception that the EU
transfers power from parliament to the executive branch. (Andersen and Burns, 1996;
Raunio, 1999) In parliamentary democracies, the executive branch must retain the
support of the legislative branch for major planks of the party platform, or else the
government will fall and new elections will be held. The problem scholars such as
Andersen and Burns (1996) have with democracy in the European Union, is that its
power is concentrated in the Council (the prime ministers of most member states plus the
presidents of France and Finland) and the European Commission who is appointed by the
prime minister or president in every member state. Andersen and Burns argue that the
institutional structure of the European Union shields the executive branch of these
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member states from the normal parliamentary scrutiny they face in domestic politics, and
strips the oversight role the domestic parliament has over its prime minister (or president)
in their capacity on the Council. Additionally, we know from Peterson and Shackleton
(2002) that the various treaties and documents which serve as the would-be constitution
for the European Union discuss very few official procedures or functions for the Council,
which gives its members considerable leeway in determining how the Council responds
in any given situation.57 In addition to the flexibility the Council enjoys, Peterson and
Shackleton state that the Council is a highly secretive body; that meets behind closed
doors with each member only bringing a skeletal staff to the meetings.
Despite the Councils’ limited formal powers, it has been quite influential in the
development of the European Union. Alberta Sbragia (1991) states that, “virtually every
decision that affected the development of the internal market since the 1980’s was taken
by the European Council.”58 Peterson adds that the all the deals between member states
that have contributed to the development of the economically interdependent Europe
have been taken at the top level.59 The considerable leeway and flexibility the Council
enjoys coupled with the large role it has played in the development of supranational
Europe make examination of citizens’ ability to influence the Council an important
question that scholars are correct to raise in the democratic deficit literature.
The second feature of the democratic deficit that typically draws scrutiny from
scholars is also institutional in nature. As I mentioned earlier, the European Parliament is
the only democratically-elected branch of the European Union and scholars have long
regarded the European Parliament as the weakest branch that composes the supranational
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organization’s institutional structure. Scholarship focused on the European Parliament
has changed considerably since Holland (1980) who argued that any increase in the
power of the European Parliament would inevitably come at the expense of national
parliaments. However, scholars started to realize that the true change in the balance of
power was occurring between the domestic parliament and domestic executive branch, as
scholars became aware of the aforementioned nature of the Council. Thus, scholars
examining the democracy deficit in Europe began to focus more heavily on the need to
strengthen the European Parliament, the only democratically-elected branch of the
European Union, as the only way to ameliorate concerns about the democracy deficit
posed by the institutional structure of the European Union. Williams (1991) and Lodge
(1994) both argued that the strengthening of the European Parliament (and the weakening
of the Council) is essential to proving European citizens a greater voice in the EC.
However, Juliet Lodge (1994) argues that the efforts to strengthen the European
Parliament are met with resistance in member-state parliaments, as they fear that a more
powerful EP will weaken the intergovernmental nature of EU policy and dramatically
increase the power of the European Union at the expense of the member states.60
While the first two arguments regarding the perception of a democratic deficit in
the European Union are institutional in nature, the third is political. Reif and Schmidt
(1980) famously argued that European elections are second-order elections in which
voters cast their ballot not bases off “European” issues, but rather for or against the
domestic government. Reif and Schmidt found that when domestic governments were
popular, their party(s) would be rewarded in the EP elections, while conversely voters
would use their EP ballot to punish the domestic government for failing to live up to
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expectations. In a very similar sense, Reif and Schmidt found that EP elections are very
similar to mid-term elections in the United States where the President can loom large in
the debate, while not actually appearing on the ballot. While Reif and Schmit’s study
focused solely on the first EP elections, Follesdal and Hix (2006) find that not much had
changed from the first EP election through the sixth.61
The extent to which parties even debate European matters in the first place is
itself a debate in the literature. We know from Ray (2004) that voters’ perception of
what effect the EU will have on their personal policy preferences will factor into their
support for EU-decision making. Additionally, Blondel et al. (1998) find some support
for the assertion that voters’ opinions on EU matters figure prominently into their
participation in EP elections. Marks et al. (2002) found that support for the traditional
party families coincides with support for the European Union, as most of the mainstream
parties in EU member states favor integration. According to Hix (1999) and Marks et al.
(2002), this essentially keeps the issue of Europeanization out of the electoral discourse,
as the dominant parties’ platforms have converged considerably on this issue. Follesdal
and Hix (2006) argue that, “the absence of a ‘European’ element in national and
European (Parliament) elections means that EU citizens’ preferences on issues on the EU
policy agenda at best have only an indirect influence on EU policy outcomes.”62
The fourth set of arguments that focus on the democracy deficit in the European
Union has both a psychological and institutional component. Scholars such as Wallance
and Smith (1995) and Majone (2009) argue that the EU is more of a regulatory state than
a traditional state, and therefore there is a perception of remoteness and disconnect from
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the will of the citizens. Wallace and Smith (1995) state that the policy process in the EU
is technocratic rather than political, and Majone (2009) believes that for that reason, the
EU should be judged on different democratic standards than a typical state-level
democracy.
Finally, the last set of arguments regarding the democratic deficit in the European
Union focus on the so-called policy drift between EU policy and citizens’ preferences.
Scholars such as Scharpf (1999) have applied many of the previous arguments toward
this one, noting the undemocratic nature of EU institutions results in a situation in which
policy outputs can be far from the preferences of the citizens.

Two Differing Perspectives:
Nevertheless, two important contributors to our understanding of supranational
Europe disagree that there is a democratic deficit within the European Union at all.
Giandomenico Majone (1994) argues for all intents and purposes that the EU is a
regulatory state. For Majone, the EU was created to deliberately isolate the member
governments from having to handle monetary policy, product standards, and health and
safety rules. Majone argues that the EU being immune to short term shocks within the
political system allows for EU leaders to make decisions that will benefit EU citizens in
the long run, rather than decisions that are in the short-term popular, but will have longterm deleterious consequences. Majone believes what the EU has is not a democratic
deficit per se, but really a “credibility crisis” that can be addressed by simply making EU
procedures more transparent.
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Andrew Moravcsik (2002) counters the concerns of an increasingly powerful
executive articulated by Andersen and Burns (1996). Moravcsik argues that
apprehension over an unaccountable executive is misguided, because executives are in
fact highly accountable to their respective electorates. For Moravcsik (who subscribes to
the school of liberal intergovernmentalism) EU decisions are primarily made at the statelevel. Therefore, a French President or Italian Prime Minister who is making decision
that are unpopular in his or her capacity as a member of the Council, will likely be
punished by the voters in their respective country next time they come up for re-election,
which would of course remove them from the Council. Thus for Moravcsik, the EU does
not have a democratic deficit, because the most powerful branch of the EU (in his view
the Council) is directly accountable to voters in the member states.
However, the Moravcsik argument only takes into account that voters in the
member states can hold their own head of government or head of state accountable. The
protests over austerity in Greece regularly were characterized by the theme that the
bailouts were not intended to help Greece at all, but rather its creditors. Greek citizens,
like the woman interviewed by the Nation, issued firm condemnations of the austerity
measures being imposed on them in exchange for bailouts. Greek citizens argued that
the austerity measures would curtail economic growth for a generation and give their
children a bleak future. However, the Greek government entered into negotiations with
the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF respectively) in a
very weak bargaining position due to its severe budget deficits, large national debt level,
and with monetary policy constraints as a result of membership in the euro. With the
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balance of power so titled toward Greek creditors, how is the democratically-elected
government of Greece supposed to try to implement the will of the Greek people?

Theoretical Development:
Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, had a profound respect for American-style
federalism, and hoped to use it as a model for supranational Europe. While there was
some elite-good will for the creation of supranational European institutions in the wake
of World War II, most leaders understood that crafting institutions that would create a
United States of Europe would undoubtedly be met with fierce resistance from skeptical
citizens throughout Western Europe. Thus the functionalist model for Europeanization
became the model of choice for integrationists, which focused on pooling sovereignty in
some policy domains and hoping that there would be spillover effects into other domains
which would require more integration. In the neo-functionalist model, Europeanization
was a self-sustaining process in which the supranational government would ultimately
aggrandize its power at the expense of the member states.
In its early days, intergovernmentalism was the school of thought which argued
that states would resist supranational Europe, and in doing so, preserve the traditional
role of the state as the central actor in all the “high politics” policy domains. (Hoffman,
1966) In the 1990’s Andrew Moravcsik added to the discourse by suggesting that all
integration would come only when it was in the state’s best interest to forfeit some
sovereignty in that policy domain.
Intergovernmentalism long seemed like the more accurate explanation for the
development of supranational Europe, particularly in the so-called Euro sclerosis period
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that began with the defeat of the European Defense Community in the French parliament
in 1954 and ended with the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. The
Single European Act paved the way for the Maastricht Treaty, and the creation of the
three pillars of the European Union.
The various institutions of the European Union each serve a purpose that
contributes to the legitimacy of the project. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is
meant to be a supranational court that has the ability to punish member states for failing
to comply with EU directives. Additionally, the ECJ found in a series of rulings that it
has the right of direct effect, or the ability to overturn a member state law if it is violation
of EU law (the supremacy clause EU style). The Commission is the agenda setter for the
European Union, and the executive branch that enforces EU law by informing a member
state it is not in compliance. In the event that a state does not bring itself into compliance
after it is warned by the commission to do so, the commission then acts as a prosecutor
who takes the state to the ECJ where a final decision will be rendered. The European
Parliament exists to give European citizens a say in the EU and to remedy concerns over
the perceived democracy deficit in the EU institutions.
This leaves the Council, which by definition is the most intergovernmental of the
four branches of the European Union. The Council is composed of the prime minister of
every member state plus the Presidents of Finland and France. With very few formal
powers and considerable leeway to act as it pleases, the Council is a very unusual
legislative branch that does not resemble any institution found in the Western
democracies. The Council exists to preserve a role for the head of government of every
member state in the European Union’s decision making process. Nevertheless, the
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Council was intended to be an advisory body, a source of guidance for the European
Union.63 However, the reality is that the Council has dominated the decision-making
process in the European Union at key moments, and has had its hand in virtually all
major decisions that have been undertaken by the EU.64
We know from Peterson and Shackleton (2002) that there is an unequal
relationship on the Council, in which larger states play a more prominent role in the
decision making than small states. Additionally, the new prime ministers (or presidents)
are supposed to be somewhat deferential on the Council to members who have served for
a greater period of time.65 The sovereign debt crisis, particularly in regard to the bailouts,
has revealed a new dynamic to Council relations. Whereas the conventional wisdom
would suggest that David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, would enjoy a
considerable role on the Council due to fact that the United Kingdom is one of the
European Union’s most powerful countries due to its large economy and strong military,
his opinions in regard to the sovereign debt crisis have been generally unsolicited due to
the fact that the British are not members of the euro. In fact, at one moment where Prime
Minister Cameron interjected with his opinion of the crisis, French President Sarkozy
publicly scolded him. The Guardian quoted Sarkozy as saying: “You have lost a good
opportunity to shut up. We are sick of you criticizing us and telling us what to do. You
say you hate the euro, and now you want to interfere in our meetings.”66 Sarkozy’s
public condemnation of the British Prime Minister’s intervention in the sovereign debt
crisis underscores the important point that by virtue of lacking full integration, the
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Council is going to have an uneven response to EU matters from once policy area to the
next. Analysis of the handling of the sovereign debt crisis reveals that it is not even the
Council per se that is at the forefront of addressing the crisis, but rather the President of
France and Chancellor of Germany, who for the most part have dictated to the other
members what the bailout plans will entail.
This strength of Sarkozy and Merkel’s bargaining position and the considerable
leeway these two have enjoyed in crafting a “European” response to the crisis evokes
serious normative questions about the democracy deficit in the European Union.
Moravcsik (2002) refutes the Andersen and Burns (1996) argument that the European
Council shields the domestic executive branch from the discretion of the national
parliament by arguing that executives are highly accountable to their respective
electorates, and therefore can be punished at home for overreaching on their capacity on
the Council. While I agree with Moravcsik’s contention, I believe his argument does not
account for the reality that was exposed by the response to the sovereign debt crisis: that
decisions can being made at the sub-Council council level and virtually imposed on
member states that have little ability to resist. Constrained by large budget deficits and
an inability to take unilateral monetary action, the Greek government entered into
negotiations with the Troika in a very weak bargaining position.

Analysis:
By the spring of 2010, it was evident to most observers that the sovereign debt
crisis in Greece was spiraling out of control, and that any solution was going to inevitably
involve intervention from other states, global financial institutions such as the IMF, and

54

the European Union. Standard and Poor’s decision to downgrade Greek bonds to junk
status was only the peak of the iceberg. The reality for the Greek economy was that there
were serious structural problems that the Greeks would have to address if they were
going to remain solvent. However the size of the Greek debt relative to their GDP
combined with their membership in the euro contributed to a situation in which the Greek
government had very few fiscal and monetary options for pursuing a unilateral path
toward austerity. Exacerbating the problem, the market began to attack the Greeks, and
borrowing costs soared to over 7% for the Greek government, making the budget deficits
even more unmanageable.
For their part, France President Nikolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel
tried to delicately balance the need to find a “European” solution to the problem without
having their governments on the hook for large, unpopular bailouts or for taking
responsibility for Greek debt. This is the dilemma, of course, of cryptofederalism
(discussed in Chapter 1) in which the member states are integrated enough for a problem
in one member state to become a problem for all, but the supranational institutions still
lack the authority to take the lead in managing the problem in a holistic fashion at the
European level. The French President and the German Chancellor both had domestic
political concerns to take into account, particularly Sarkozy whose approval numbers
were struggling throughout 2011 and into 2012, when he was a candidate for re-election.
Given that French banks are large creditors to Greece, the French President had
considerable interest in crafting a solution to the debt crises in which Greece would avoid
defaulting on large loans owed to French banks. German Chancellor Merkel also
opposed a Greek default for fear of what deleterious consequences it would have for the
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eurozone, but her opposition to default was partially offset by the understanding that any
bailout of the Greek government would inevitably entail a significant contribution from
German taxpayers. With so much on the line for both leaders and their respective
countries, it is understandable that they would want to play an integral role in crafting any
EU policy toward embattled Greece.
Throughout 2010 and 2011, the markets continued to be very unkind to Greece,
and speculators bet that Greece would inevitably default on its commitments and perhaps
leave or be kicked out of the eurozone. The result was skyrocketing borrowing costs for
the Greek government which exacerbated their already alarming budget deficits. Merkel
eventually warmed to the idea of bailouts to help Greece survive the short-term turmoil,
but resisted many of the proposals that would have more long-term stabilizing effects
such as the European Central Bank printing Eurobonds.67 The main features of the
second Greek bailout would be countries such as Germany borrowing money through a
bailout fund (presumably for reasonably cheap) and lend the money to Greece at a lower
rate than what the markets would lend the troubled Greek government if left on their
own. Additionally, France and Germany hoped to restructure the Greek debt by
convincing banks to swap a portion in exchange for new bonds.68 The lending costs for
the new bonds were to be roughly 4%, a figure much lower than the 7% costs Greece had
been facing, and was likely to save the Greek government about 100 billion euro.69 The
bailout package was far from unconditional, and in exchange for the bailout funds and
restructuring of debt, the Greek government was strong armed into adopting a wide-range
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of austerity measures including deep reductions of pensions and salaries, changes to
collective bargaining laws, tax increases, increasing retirement ages, and laying off
30,000 public sector employees.70
Realizing the bailout and accompanying austerity measures were unpopular with
the Greek people, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou suggested a referendum in
Greece on whether or not the government should accept the terms of the German and
French led bailout.71 The response to the proposed referendum was shock and horror
from the German Chancellor and French President. Sarkozy lamented that he felt
“betrayed” by Prime Minister Papandreou’s sudden referendum proposal, after months of
working closely with him over the details of the bailout package. Merkel went even
further, stating that Greece could be kicked out of the euro if the prime minister went
through with his proposed referendum.72 The markets responded quickly to the
perception of political chaos, and in a matter of days the Greek prime minister jettisoned
his referendum proposal.
I argue that the handling of the financial crisis creates a new facet of the
democracy deficit with which scholars should be engaging. When the fate of the euro
was most in jeopardy, the German Chancellor and the French President took it upon
themselves to craft a solution that they believed protected the economies tied to the euro.
The Germans resisted greater action from the European Central Bank, such as a proposal
that they print euro bonds to help troubled member states cope with massive borrowing
costs. The other European Union institution at the forefront of the crisis, the
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Commission, lacked the gravitas to negotiate a key deal between member states, and
certainly would not be able to guarantee that any deal reached there could be passed by
the domestic parliaments. The Council once again was forced to lead the EU through
troubled waters, but this time it was a few key players on the Council, hardly the entire
organization. Thus the question becomes, how do Greek voters dissatisfied with what the
German and French leaders have proposed for their country hold them accountable?
When foreign leaders can apply enough pressure for a prime minister to jettison a
referendum over a major restructuring of the domestic economy, are we in the
Papandreou quote world in which the market place squeezes democratic control?
For their part, many Greek people believe they have lost their voice in this new
political and economic system. The woman who told the Nation that France and
Germany were insisting that the Greeks adopt austerity measures that they would never
advocate for their own country articulates a very important concern over the democratic
deficit in the European Union. As Moravcsik correctly notes, members of the Council
are checked by their respective domestic legislature, and any action they take in their
capacity as Council members can find their way into their domestic political discourse.
However, the situation in which prominent Council members such as the German
Chancellor and French President can be so influential in determining what austerity
measures Greece pursues in their attempt to remain solvent is a different world
altogether. The German Chancellor and the French President, while ultimately beholden
to the German and French voters, have no incentive to work out deals that are favorable
to Greek citizens, and Greek citizens have no recourse for holding the German
Chancellor or French President accountable. While the Greek citizens were represented
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by their own government who had a seat at the bargaining table, it is important to note
that a tenuous governing coalition and economic chaos considerably weakened the Greek
government’s position at the bargaining table. In an effort to ensure the Greek citizens’
voices were heard, Prime Minister Papandreou proposed that the bailout and austerity
measures be put before the Greek citizens in a referendum. The French President and
German Chancellor reacted in horror, with Chancellor Merkel going so far as to say that
if Prime Minister Papandreou went through with the referendum, it would be grounds for
Greece being kicked out of the Eurozone.73

Conclusion:
The imperfect nature of European Union integration leaves the entire project at a
crossroads. The tragedy of cryptofederalism is that integration in some areas without
corresponding integration in others leaves the EU in situations where problems in one
member state can be transferred to another, but there may not be an institution that has
the capacity to address the supranational problem. This is reminiscent of the jointdecision trap discussed by Scharpf (1988). The EU lacks political integration because
member states, who play a large part in EU decision making, block greater a greater
degree of integration from occurring. In turn, the poorly-integrated EU generates sub
optimal outputs. The European Union undoubtedly has achieved considerable success in
economic integration, culminating with the successful launch of the euro in 2002.
However, the failure of the European Union to achieve a corresponding level of political
integration was evident when the monetary union started to face serious challenges as a

73

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2057377/Merkel-threat-Greece-Well-kick-EU-holdreferendum.html

59

result of the global economic crisis in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in many member
states starting in 2009. With no single EU political entity able to take the lead in
managing the situation, the crisis worsened and spread in 2010 and 2011, and many
people began to question the prospects for the Eurozone to remain intact or integrate
prospective members in Eastern and Central Europe. In the absence of EU leadership,
the German Chancellor and French President took the lead role in managing the crisis,
but this is hardly the type of political authority that gives credibility to a supranational
organization.
I assume some readers will state that Greece and every other member state
voluntarily agreed to transfer some sovereignty when they joined the European Union in
exchange for the benefits of membership. Additionally, given that membership is
voluntary, states are allowed to leave whenever they please. Both of these arguments are
obviously true, and we could be in a situation where some member states make that
decision down the road. Nevertheless, a member state leaving the European Union is
likely a last-resort that many states would hope to avoid given the benefits of membership
in the supranational organization. Therefore, the framework I use to make an argument
about a democratic deficit is not that it is so pronounced that no member state should be a
part of the European Union, but rather that all parties should work together to make sure
the European Union is the best possible version of itself.
A common criticism of the European Union is that it is too technocratic and
remote to ever respond to the demands of the various groups of citizens it represents.
The EU has done little to address this perception by failing to craft democratic
supranational political institutions that are able to manage the level of economic
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integration that currently exists in the European Union. Thus, as the Greek Prime
Minister’s prescient quote says, when you separate the market and politics, you
essentially eliminate democratic control.
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“Would it not be easier
In that case for the government
To dissolve the people
And elect another?”74
Chapter 3: Democracy Deficit: By Design?
Introduction:
Key votes in the United State House of Representatives are often played out in
dramatic fashion. While normally a House Speaker will only call for a vote on a major
piece of legislation when he or she knows they have enough votes to win, there are a few
votes in which the outcome is uncertain and the negotiating and bargaining process
continues right until the moment the Speaker bangs the gavel to declare the vote closed.
House Speakers have for decades kept key votes open while their side continues to piece
together a majority only to immediately declare that vote closed once that majority is
reached.
The advantage of keeping a vote open or closed is one of the many that the
majority party has in American politics. However, in no uncertain terms, those who
favor integration have utilized similar advantages in winning referenda outcomes
favorable to the development of supranational Europe. We have an expression in
American politics: elections have consequences. This expression can often be heard
when power changes hands between the parties, and the new party of government comes
into the session believing the election gave them a mandate to pursue their respective
party platform. In contrast, referenda in Europe often do not have consequences,
especially when the initial outcome is won by the opposition to stronger European
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integration. What typically occurs in the aftermath of a “no” vote is the government
makes a few minor modifications, and resubmits the question to voters for
reconsideration. One Irish voter who switched his vote over the Lisbon Treaty from “no”
in the first referendum to “yes” in the subsequent one describes his rationale for doing so:

"It was like being sent back to the drawing board and told: 'Think again.' I think many like me who have
switched sides and voted yes this time just feel we don't really have a choice. It's a bit like Groundhog Day.
We all have this horrible feeling that we will be made to do this referendum over and over again until we
return the answer they want."75

The unique process by which referenda outcomes are deemed to be final when the
result favors the integrationists, but discarded when the opposition wins is far too often
ignored in the democratic deficit literature, as it raises serious normative questions about
citizens’ political efficacy in regard to the European Union. Opponents of deepening
integration already face considerable obstacles that make it difficult to compete in
referenda campaigns, given the typical model in which the government leads the “yes”
campaign and the opposition is normally limited in terms of resources and confined to
one or two smaller opposition parties. Despite these inherent disadvantages, euroskeptics
have had considerable success at the ballot box in regard to questions over strengthening
supranational Europe, including wins against the Treaty of the European Union in
Denmark, the Treaty of Nice in Ireland, the EU Constitution in France and the
Netherlands, and most recently the treaty of Lisbon again in Ireland. However, in the
instances of Denmark in regard to TEU and Ireland over Lisbon, successful “no”
campaigns have almost immediately had to face a rematch, and have in both instances
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lost to integrationists on the subsequent attempt. In this chapter, I will examine the
aftermath of a successful “no” campaign, and raise important normative questions about
the fairness of the integration process.

Literature Review:
Sarah Hobolt (2009) states that direct democracy is flourishing in the industrial
democracies and points out that a total of 497 national referendums were held in the
period from 1993-2003, with 301 of those taking place in Europe.76 Specifically, the
majority of those referenda have pertained to European integration.77 Scholars and
statesmen have long debated the merits of representative democracy vs. direct democracy
from Rousseau who believed that direct democracy was the only way to maintain the
social contract to Madison who argued in Federalist 10 that direct democracy would
revert to tyranny of the majority over the minority.
The public’s capacity to make informed decisions in regard to direct democracy
has long been a prominent debate in the literature. John Matsusaka (2004) states, “an
obvious concern with direct democracy is that it places decision-making power in the
hands of the uninformed.”78Campbell et al. (1980) famously characterized the American
electorate as being “almost wholly without detailed information about decision making in
government,” to the point that it would be difficult for them to engage in rational political
behavior.79 However, we know from studies such as Mendelsohn and Parkin (2001) that
political behavior is mediated by elites and institutions, and that the process of direct
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democracy is in reality not the unchecked free for all that the harshest critics of direct
democracy imagine. Noting the elite influence on public opinion, John Zaller (1992)
reminds us that, “the chorus of public opinion has a distinct upper-class accent.”80
Studies of public opinion in regard to supranational Europe have flourished in the
last two decades as the number of referenda associated with EU has increased. However,
early classics in the public opinion literature such as Lindberg and Scheingold (1970)
noted that public indifference to European integration gave elites considerable leeway in
driving the process. In their seminal 1970 study, Lindberg and Scheingold argued that
integration occurs as a result of a “permissive consensus” in which elites drive integration
while the lay person in the member states pays very little attention to European issues.
According to Lindberg and Scheingold, European integration is not an issue that is likely
to become salient to the public, therefore the political elites in the society had
considerable leeway in European matters to strike the course that they wished.
Nevertheless, Lindberg and Scheingold cautioned their readers that the permissive
consensus would only hold to a point, after which a degree of integration would be
reached at which the public would start to closely scrutinize the issue of supranational
Europe.
The notion that the permissive consensus had run its course became prominent in
the aftermath of the Danish voting down the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht
Treaty) in 1992. Mark Franklin et al. (1994) note that support for supranational Europe
was high throughout EC member states in the lead up to the referenda over Maastricht,
including Denmark where 68% of respondents agreed that membership in the EC had
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benefited the country.81 Franklin et al. argue that it was not the general concept of the
European Union that propelled voters to voting against Maastricht, but rather the sense
that integration had gone too far. Martin Slater (1982) expresses a similar sentiment.
“…There is a high level of goodwill towards a united Europe; the degree of the positive
commitment is more suspect. The public appear to favour European integration in the
same way they favour peace. Both are generally desirable goals. The full implications
and costs of attaining a goal such as European unification are left unconsidered.”82
Franklin et al. note that as details of some of the provisions of Maastricht became known
by the electorates in member-states such as France and Denmark, opposition to
ratification began to mobilize and gain the upper hand in the campaign.
A considerable portion of the literature debates whether positions regarding
European integration are generated from the top-down or the bottom-up. While most
scholars coalesce around the viewpoint that integration is an elite-driven process, there
are few studies that suggest that the general public is the driving force behind integration.
Martin Slater notes that Walter Hallstein, the first and one of the most influential
Presidents of the Commission, once argued in the 1960’s that “the decisions that have
been taken lag far behind public opinion in Europe.”83 Ronald Inglehart (1978) also
found considerable public support for European integration, particularly amongst
Europeans with higher educational levels and those with better exposure to mass
communication (essentially Europeans who live in the big cities). Inglehart found that
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these individuals were prone to be receptive about a re-definition of political community
expanded from the state to the EC.84
Nevertheless, the bulwark of the contemporary literature regarding public opinion
and the European Union emphasizes the elite-driven nature of the European project.
Many studies in this pool of literature examine the link between salient domestic politics
and the less salient European politics. In fact, perhaps the most easily identifiable schism
in the referenda literature is the one between those who believe that EU referenda voters
are “issue voters” who weigh the costs and benefits and make a decision on a referenda
according to their views on the EU and the “second-order” school of thought which
suggests that voters’ behavior regarding EU referenda is based primarily on their attitudes
regarding domestic politics. Reif and Schmitt (1980) argued that European Parliament
elections are merely second-order elections in which voters punish or reward the
domestic government with their vote for members of the European Parliament. The
second-order election concept is the equivalent of American mid-term elections in which
the party of the President is often punished or rewarded based off of the popularity of the
President and he public’s satisfaction with his job performance. Slater (1982) points out
that the turnout for the first election in which the European Parliament was elected in
1979 was roughly 62% of the election, which is considerably lower than the average for
European states, many of whom have compulsory voting. Nevertheless, Slater is able to
find both positives and negatives in the turnout for the first EP elections. The negative
was that the novelty factor of the first democratic vote for EP office certainly did not
elevate participation beyond normal levels. However, the positive light could be that
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over 110 million Europeans turned out for an election that had no direct or indirect
impact on government formations.85
Schneider and Weitsman (1996) argue that referenda over the European Union
pose a “punishment trap” to the voters when their party is in the government that
negotiated the treaty. Schneider and Weitsman contend that European voters are wellacquainted with the notion of a confidence vote, and thus are reluctant to vote against a
referendum their domestic government supports for fear of sending a message that the
government has lost its ability to effectively govern its working coalition. Additional
research focuses on the opposite scenario in which the government is unpopular and
voters punish the domestic government by voting against its wishes on the EU referenda.
Franklin et al. (1994) attribute the Danes’ no vote against Maastricht in 1992 as a vote to
punish the domestic Danish government. Franklin et al.(1994) argue that there was a
linkage between a low-salience policy arena which was the ratification of the EU and a
high salience policy area which was the Danish government’s handling of the domestic
economy.86 Franklin (2002) updates the original thesis by suggesting that the salience of
the EU referenda can have important implications for the degree to which voters rely on
party cues to make their decisions on EU matters. Franklin argues that voters will be
more likely to vote based upon their own policy preferences in highly salient matters, but
will be more likely to follow trusted opinion leaders in policy areas of low salience, as an
information shortcut in the absence of perfect information.
Other studies counter the second-order school of thought, particularly Palle
Svensson (2002) who argued that the Franklin thesis does not hold up when examined
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empirically. Svensson found that many voters in Denmark voted differently than their
party leadership, a finding he argues dispels the notion of votes over European matters
being merely second-order elections. Svensson examines five Danish referenda over
Europe, and his findings suggest that the voters do not behave in accordance with the
Franklin thesis of merely voting for or against a party or government. (in fact he found
that voters behaved opposite of what the Franklin hypothesis would be predict in some
cases) Siune et al. (1992, 1994) and Svensson (1994, 2002) have all argued that voters
behave in referenda in accordance with their policy preferences. Scholars in the issuevoting school of thought on EU referenda can be closely associated with the proximity
model for voting in which voters select candidates or positions closest to their desired
ideal point on an issue dimension. (Downs 1957) Svensson sums up the difference
between the two schools of thought succinctly: “it is a question of whether voters really
address the issues and involve themselves in the process on a vital issue, or merely vote
for or against the government.”87
Other studies examine how nuances of particular cases impact the importance of
these factors in referenda. Simon Hug argues in his 2002 book Voices of Europe that
institutional features determine how closely the voters follow their choice of party in
regard to EU referenda. Hug finds that when the referenda are binding, voters will be
more likely to follow opinion leaders from their party on the matter. Additionally, Hug
finds that voters will be more likely to support their party’s position on a referenda when
the government’s decision to call the referenda was not constitutionally mandatory, an
important finding that suggests possible rewards for a government that consults with its
respective electorate rather than just ram integration bills through the parliament.
87
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Sara Hobolt (2009) made a profound contribution to the referenda literature by
testing many theories that have been put forth by scholars who study European referenda.
Hobolt analyzes voter knowledge about the subject of the referenda and issue position on
the matter, finding that voters with more information are increasingly likely to resist elite
opinions, and form an opinion on the matter that is consistent with his or her own policy
preferences.88 Additionally, Hobolt’s study analyzes the campaign effects on the voting
behavior in the referenda. She finds that intensely- contested campaigns will likely drive
up turnout for a referendum, and increase the likelihood that the public has better
information about what is at stake in the vote. However, she notes that it is not just the
quantity of information the voters have that is important, but rather how well the
information that is available lets the voters diagnose the various positions and make an
informed decision.89
The literature regarding direct democracy and the European Union is rich, and
many scholars have made important contributions to our understanding of voting
behavior in regard to referenda in the EU. There are still very few definitive answers in
this body of literature, and the productive debate over voting behavior, issue salience, the
role of elites in this process continues. However, I argue that scholars have ignored some
normative questions regarding the referenda process in Europe, and that this is
concerning given the prominent role referenda have played in the Europeanization
process. Studies that focus on the nature of campaigns, role of elites, and salience of the
questions have contributed to our understanding, but are we ignoring a more basic,
fundamental question? Is the process of Europeanization so slanted toward the
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integrationists that it denies those who are reticent about supranational Europe a voice,
even in the instances when they are the majority?

Theoretical Development:
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the institutional structure of the European
Union and intergovernmental features of some of its decision making process have
attracted several studies about the perception of a democratic deficit in the EU. However,
most of these have focused upon the European Parliament, the sole democraticallyelected institution of the European Union, and whether or not attempts to strengthen its
powers ameliorate concerns over the democratic deficit. It may appear counter intuitive
to claim that a democratic deficit exits in the referendum process, because at face value
referenda are by definition direct democracy at work. However, when one analyzes the
referendum process and the considerable advantages that the “yes” campaign normally
enjoys, questions about the fairness of the process and political efficacy of EU citizens
should arise.
As I have mentioned, the “yes” campaign for a referendum question is typically
led by the government, and in many instances several opposition parties join with the
domestic government in urging a “yes” vote. We know from previous research (Mair
2001, Taggart 1998) that mainstream domestic parties generally hold pro-European
Union positions; meaning removing one pro-Europe government from power generally
means simply replacing it with another one. Even scholars who disagree with the
assessment that mainstream parties vary little in terms of their orientation toward the
European Union agree that a general consensus exists amongst the elites that seeks to
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keep the issue of Europeanization marginal in the domestic political discourse. (Bartolini
2005)

In the case of the Irish vote over Lisbon, every relevant party in the Oireachtas

(Irish Parliament) except for Sinn Fein favored the “yes” vote, and together these parties
represented over 80% of the vote share in the previous election.90
However, it is not just the coalescing of elite opinion around the EU that
constrains the opposition. The institutional structure of the European Union itself
dramatically differs from a typical state, and some principles of a traditional
parliamentary or presidential democracy are fundamentally absent in the European
Union. Robert Dahl argued in the seminal volume Political Oppositions in Western
Democracies (1966) that three milestones normally attained in consolidated democracies:
the right for citizens to participate (vote), the right of the citizens to be represented, and
the formation of an organized opposition to appeal for votes against the government.91
Mair (2007) indicates that while the European Union meets the first two criteria, it has no
component that addresses the third.92 As Leonard Shapiro noted in his forward to Dahl’s
Political Oppositions, the absence of this mechanism deprives the citizens of a channel
for punishing the government for overreaching its authority or pursuing policies that are
incongruent with the will of the people. “Revolutions become necessary because the
polity has failed to integrate opposition within government, and to provide it with an
outlet,” Shapiro argued.93 Dahl would go on to presciently warn that the presence of a
“surplus of consensus” would eventually lead many in Western democracies who were
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frustrated with the status quo to develop an opposition to the form of government itself.94
While Dahl was referring to domestic governments, his early work has taken on
considerable significance to contemporary scholars who study the EU. Noting the lack of
an organized opposition to the European Union itself, scholars such as Mair (2007) and
Majone (2009) have rightfully noted that opposition to the European Union has come
from the people themselves.
This gets to the heart of my democratic deficit argument. If the people have
become the true loyal opposition to the European Union, discussion and analysis of the
process by which their voice is heard is essential for understanding the nature of
democracy in the EU. Given the aforementioned advantages that are typically enjoyed by
those who favor integration, it is remarkable that the opposition is able to win on a
nationwide referendum question. However, despite the considerable obstacles the
opposition must overcome, they have prevailed in key votes in Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, and Ireland. Nevertheless in regard to Denmark over Maastricht and Ireland
over Lisbon, the final result was not to accept the outcome of the vote, but rather to stage
a rematch and sweeten the pot enough to switch enough “no” votes to “yes” in order for
the referendum to pass.
For me, this raises several normative questions that scholars do not seem to be
addressing. Is it fair to think of a “yes” vote in a referendum as a final outcome, but a
“no” vote as a stepping stone for ultimately securing a “yes” vote? Have those who favor
greater European integration set a moving target for defeating their proposals that
euroskeptics can never hit? Does the opposition to the European Union have a strong
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enough voice in the democratic institutions or process to influence how the supranational
organization conducts itself?
These are big questions that scholars should not shy away from. Nevertheless,
this type of normative question is very complex, and difficult to answer in the scope of
any one study. As a first cut, I believe analysis of how and why Europeanization moves
forward even when the people throw a wrench in the process is an important foundation
for understanding the democratic deficit concerns writ large. To offer more insight into
the referenda rematch process, I will examine the aftermath of three notable “no” votes in
regard to supranational Europe: The Danish rejection of Maastricht, the French “no” vote
on the constitution, and the Irish snub of Lisbon.

Case Selection:
The cases of Denmark and Ireland are essentially parallel cases that were selected
by Mill’s method of agreement. In terms of both the initial referendum result and the
subsequent reversal, these two cases are the same in regard to outcome, which helps set a
baseline for studying referenda rematches and their fairness. The case of France and the
“no” vote on the Constitution has many similar features to Denmark and Ireland, but is
different in terms of outcome as French President Jacques Chirac elected to not re-submit
the ratification question to the French people. However, that is not to say that every
provision of the would-be constitution died with the “no” vote; and in fact some were
rammed through the French National Assembly in an effort to salvage some of the
Constitution from the stinging defeat at the ballot box. I have included a succinct truth
table that can help make sense of the three cases below.
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Table 3.1: Truth Table for Danish, French, and Irish Cases
Denmark
The referendum was constitutionally necessary
The voters reject the treaty or constitution the first time
The no-vote leads to a subsequent referendum
The voters ratify the treaty the second time
The party/parties in power campaigned for a “yes” vote
Presence of a corruption scandal during the campaign.
The “no” campaign lagged in resources to the “yes”
Opinion polls revealed the government was unpopular
The “yes” campaign was divided

France

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y

Y
Y
N
N/A95
Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Ireland
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y

Denmark: The Danish divide over Maastricht
Denmark has long fascinated scholars who focus on public opinion of integration,
and the Danes have had considerable history with eventful referenda in regard to the
European Union. The Danes joined the European Community in 1972 with 79% of the
members of the Folketingent (Danish Parliament) favoring membership and 63% of the
Danish people voting “yes” in the national referendum to join.96 Despite the initial
popularity of Danish membership in supranational Europe, opinion polls in the late
1970’s and 1980’s revealed a much more even split in the Danish electorate as to whether
or not membership in the European Community was a good thing. This period in general
after the first round of enlargement is known for being a period of so-called
Eurosclerosis, in which public opinion of the EC was less enthusiastic than the
permissive consensus days in which integration could be driven by the elites with little
public interference. The commission presidency of Jacques Delors and passage of the
95
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Single European Act (SEA) is largely credited with revitalizing the European project, and
transitioning the EC more fully toward a truly-integrated common market. While met
with considerable excitement in some member-states, the Danes were closely-divided on
the question of whether or not to ratify the SEA, and from the onset most expected the
referendum to be hotly-contested campaign. While conventional wisdom normally states
that the mainstream parties typically will support supranational Europe in referendum
campaigns, the Social Democrats,(the largest party in the parliament at the time), Social
Liberals, and Socialists all favored rejection of the Single European Act, as they were
uncomfortable with the capitalist nature of some of the SEA provisions and the Social
Liberals were reticent about the language of common European defense.97 Nevertheless,
the left was highly fractured in coordinating an effective “no” campaign, and rumors and
speculation were circling through Denmark about what type of consequences a “no” vote
would entail. In the end, the Single European Act was ratified by Danish voters with
56% of the electorate voting “yes”.
In the aftermath of the hotly-contested referendum on the SEA, many would
expect the campaign over Maastricht to follow a similar trajectory. Nevertheless, after
suffering defeat in the SEA referendum, the Social Democrats began to chart a much
more pro-European stance.98 The change of heart of the largest party on the left in
Danish politics drastically altered the balance of elite opinion in Denmark in favor of the
integrationists. In the spring of 1991, public opinion polls in Denmark as well as other
places indicated that general support for Europe was high. In a series of Eurobarometer
polls leading up to the referenda over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, considerable
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majorities answered affirmatively when asked if membership in the European
Community was a good thing.99 In fact, the percentage of Danes who answered
affirmatively actually increased from the spring of 1991 until the spring of 1992,
indicating the presence of some momentum for the “yes” campaign in the lead up to the
referendum.
Nevertheless, Mark Franklin et al (1996) note that the opinion polls revealed large
amounts of ambivalence and ignorance in regard to opinions over Europe.100 The Single
European Act (1987) had reversed a period of stagnation for the European Project, and
reinvigorated the process of Europeanization. The SEA undoubtedly paved the way for
Maastricht, and while voters in most member states generally agreed that membership in
the EC provided their country benefits, an up or down vote over a specific agreement is
much different than a general positive disposition over an abstract concept such as
Europe. As Franklin (1996) points out, each provision of the Maastricht Treaty (or any
treaty) is likely to garner some opposition from one segment of the society or another,
and that the only way to offset this is to include provisions that are popular with each
segment of the population to ensure passage. Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) argue that
such log rolling occurred at the elite level and was responsible for elite opinion
coalescing around the SEA, but Franklin argues that this process is much trickier when
one is dealing with the entire population for a country.
Nevertheless, the “yes” campaign still had the benefit in Denmark of having
across the board support from all the major parties of the government, at least at the
outset. In fact, 83% of the members of the Danish Parliament voted to ratify the
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Maastricht Treaty, falling just 15 votes shy of the threshold supporters needed in order to
bypass holding a binding referendum on the matter altogether.101 Public opinion polls
revealed a much closer split amongst the people, with the “undecided” camp having a
plurality in opinion polls until April of 1992 when the “no” campaign took a slight lead in
public opinion.102 Despite the uncertainty the polls suggested, proponents of Maastricht
were confident they would prevail, given the strong consensus amongst the leaders from
virtually all of Denmark’s political parties. Additionally, every major newspaper in
Denmark had endorsed ratification, and many trade unions that had opposed joining the
EC in 1972 and ratification of the SEA in 1986 had switched their position to a reluctant
“yes” on Maastricht.103
The organized “no” campaign in Denmark was very small compared to France in
2005 and lacking the resources of the 2009 “no” campaign against Lisbon in Ireland. Led
by fringe parties on the left and right, the “no” vote was essentially no more than a
loosely aligned coalition that opposed Europe for a variety of different reasons.
Nevertheless, as is often the case in referenda, each campaign takes on a life of its own,
and it became clear by the summer of 1992 that the “yes” campaign was underperforming
compared to expectations. Whereas there was not the presence of a corruption scandal
that dogged the government like in France and Ireland, the government was not without
its political baggage in Denmark. A schism in the Social Democratic Party in Denmark
between its Chairman Svend Auken and his deputy Poul Nyrup Rasmussen played out
quite publicly in the spring of 1992.104 Although the dispute had nothing to do with
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Europe, scholars such as Svensson and Hobolt argue that effectively curtailed the Social
Democratic Party’s effort to mount a unified campaign in support of Maastricht. With
division in the elites, the campaign for Maastricht was far from the slam dunk that many
had initially expected.
The “yes” campaign had other flaws that were becoming all too apparent as the
campaign dragged on. Sara Hobolt (2009) argues that if we think about the 1992
campaign in the Netherlands in a spatial model of voting, we can see a major obstacle for
the “yes” position. Whereas the decision on whether or not to join the EC was a clear
“yes” or “no” decision, the opposition to Maastricht in 1992 carefully crafted a message
to voters that voting “no” would simply maintain the status quo of keeping Denmark in
the EC without forfeiting more of its sovereignty. One of the slogans during the
campaign became, “yes to Europe, no to the Union” a reassuring nod to voters on the
fence that voting “no” would not have the deleterious consequences the “doomsday”
people in the “yes” camp were suggesting.105 Hobolt maintains that the “yes” campaign
unwittingly contributed to this notion that nothing would happen in the event of a “no”
vote, particularly when Rasmussen assured the voters that Denmark would get a second
chance to vote for Maastricht in the event that the first ballot failed with a special
agreement with the EC plus “all the benefits of Maastricht.”106
Finally, many scholars point to the lack of a coherent message for the “yes”
campaign in Denmark. Hobolt argues that the opposition did an excellent job of agenda
setting for the debate, forcing the more powerful “yes” campaign to go on the defensive
for much of the first campaign. Franklin (2008) argues that pro-European parties should

105
106

Hobolt, page 171
Hobolt, page 171

79

have utilized their campaign to strongly make a case for a pro-European position, but
instead were all too quick to play down support for a single currency and common
defense policy while the opposition clearly articulated their position that a “yes” vote
would create a United States of Europe arrangement.
The considerable advantages the “yes” campaign enjoyed at the outset were
ultimately offset by a perfect storm of blunders that cost them the campaign. On June 2,
1992, the Danish people voted to reject the Maastricht Treaty by a vote of 50.7%- 49.3%.
The vote startled the integrationists throughout the continent, and Danish politicians who
were associated with the “yes” campaign immediately scrambled to find a way to join the
European Union anyway.
Following the Danish “no” vote, a meeting of foreign ministers from the EC made
one thing clear: there would be no re-negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, and that
Denmark was going to have to craft its own solution.107 Hobolt (2009) argues that the
Danish proponents of a “yes” vote were very careful not to appear to simply re-submit to
the voters what they had already rejected, and were very cognizant of the fact that they
needed a party from the “no” campaign to switch their position in order to demonstrate to
voters that switching their position was warranted in light of new circumstances.108
Many advocates agreed that the best way to ensure a pro-Maastricht vote would
be to craft a solution in which there was a clear European framework in which Denmark
would be an integral part of, but nevertheless have the opportunity to opt out in instances
that the Danes believed it was in their best interest to do so. Additionally, the Edinburgh
Agreement made clear overtures to the leftist parties that had voted against the Maastricht
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Treaty in the first referendum, in an attempt to isolate the far-right as the only major
group to oppose ratification.109
Hobolt argues that domestic factors played a circumstance as well, including the
fact that the government that had led the first “yes” vote had afterward been sacked and
replaced with a new government now led by the center-left. Hoping that cooperation
could get them in the government, the parties on the left were greased into switching their
position and siding with the government on the second campaign. Furthermore, then
Prime Minister Rasmussen (who had made the blunder of suggesting that holding out
could get the Danes more the second time around) made it clear in the second campaign
that there would be no more sweetening of the pot, and what the deal that they were
seeing before them is all that they were going to get.110
The framing for the second referendum was critical to both sides’ strategy for the
campaign. The “yes” campaign, according to its chief campaign strategist and Danish
foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen had to convince people that the “Edinburgh
Agreement had created a new basis for referendum…We had to convince people that
they were voting about something else than what they had just rejected.” For their part,
the “no” campaign derided the government for simply altering a few things in order to
change peoples’ votes; and referred to the Edinburgh Agreement as “the Emperor’s new
clothes.”111
The “yes” campaign had the difficult task of switching votes from “no” to “yes’
while carefully avoiding the appearance of insulting the voters by submitting the same
question to them twice. Nevertheless, opinion polls that were ominous for the “yes”
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vote’s chances in the lead up to the first referendum consistently revealed a comfortable
lead for the rematch that was never relinquished. On May 18, 1993 the Danes reversed
their previous decision and voted to ratify Maastricht by a margin of 56.7%-43.3%.112
The reason for the switch is a hot topic amongst scholars. Franklin et al. (1994)
argue that the replacement of an unpopular government involved in a corruption scandal
with a more popular government gave the “yes” campaign better leadership and buoyed
their chances of convincing the electorate to accept Maastricht.113 However, Svensson
(2002) counters this indicating that Gallup data suggests that percentage of the electorate
that supported the government in the two Danish elections prior to the Maastricht votes
increased from 31.8% to just over 34%, hardly enough of a switch to justify the 7%
swing in the vote of the two referendums.114 However, Hobolt (2009) finds that the
levels of satisfaction with the domestic government was not the most important domestic
factor that influence the vote, but rather the partisanship of the voters and the new centerleft government. That being said, Hobolt rejects the Franklin assertion that referenda are
merely second-order elections that reward or punish domestic governments, and finds
considerable support for the argument that voters’ positions in regard to the European
Union led to the outcome. Her study specifically looks at voters who switched their vote
as a group, and found that many where in the middle of the spectrum in regard to their
attitudes and orientations toward the European Union. Thus, Hobolt believes that the
government insisting that the second referendum was absolutely Denmark’s last chance
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to join the European Union altered the cost-benefit calculus of these voters in the center
enough to switch many of their votes from “no” to “yes”.115
Hobolt’s study provides credible evidence against the Franklin thesis that voters
do not know or understand the details of referendum questions well enough to make an
informed decision, and instead rely on the domestic government’s cues to make the
assessment. However, even Franklin himself acknowledges that the Danes have a
comparatively high understanding of the European Union, and that political issues such
as supranational Europe are more salient in Denmark than in some other member
states.116 However, Denmark is not the only member state in which citizens have thrown
a wrench in the integration process, and perhaps to date there was no greater setback for
the European Union at the ballot box than the French and Dutch rejections of the
Constitution in 2005.

France: “Oui a l’Union: Non a la Constitution”
Like with many referenda over the European Union, the French “oui” campaign
in 2005 was led by the top person in French politics at the time, then President Jacques
Chirac. Chirac was flanked by the mainstream parties on the left and the right, and
figured to be on paper the clear favorite to win the campaign, given the resources at the
government’s disposal. Additionally, France is a member of the original 6 member states
where support for the EU is typically higher than states that joined in the first round of
expansion in the early 1970’s.
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Nevertheless, there were harbingers that spelled trouble for the “oui” campaign
from the onset.

Re-elected in the absurd presidential election in 2002, Jacques Chirac’s

approval rating was at an all-time low in the midst of the 2005 campaign over the EU
constitution, and many French citizens were hoping that if the “oui” campaign was not
successful, the embattled president would resign in the matter Charles De Gaulle did in
1969. Despite the fact that President Chirac insisted he would not resign as a result of a
“non” vote, the personal unpopularity of the president and the ongoing investigation
surrounding corruption allegations stemming from his term as mayor of Paris were
undoubtedly a burden for the “oui” campaign and several studies make the case that
France is perhaps the best example of the second-order school of thought that suggests
the referendum question is less important than the public’s perception of the domestic
government. (Ivaldi 2006, Delhousse 2006) A 2005 edition of the Financial Times
summarized the campaign succinctly: “The French President’s support was borrowed,
not earned, and on Sunday many voters gleefully called in their loans.”117
Nevertheless, I argue that while it is convenient for the integrationists to place the
blame over the “non” vote entirely on Chirac, this approach belies the fact that the Dutch
people also rejected the Constitution. Additionally, the campaign was contested over
serious social and economic issues that made the campaign bigger than just a confidence
vote on the leadership of Jacques Chirac. While the Socialist Party, the largest party on
the left in contemporary French politics, officially campaigned for a “oui” vote, several
prominent members of the party defected and joined the “non” campaign. The most
prominent of the insurgent Socialist Party members was former Prime Minister Laurent
Fabius, who provided the “non” campaign a degree of clout that was not present in the
117
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Danish vote over Maastricht. Throughout the campaign, Fabius maintained a firm
commitment to the idea of Europe, but he did not believe the version of the EU the
French were getting was best for the country. Specifically, many on the left railed
against the notion of “Bolkstein’s Europe” (named for the EU commissioner who
proposed liberalization of the economic union) and advocated for a more socialized
vision of what Europe could be.118 Thus, the rallying cry for the leftist opposition to the
constitution in France was not “non a l’Union” but rather “Une Autre Europe” (Another
Europe).119
The disparate elements on the left that composed the “non” campaign were joined
by the far-right, and Front National’s leader Jean Marie Le Pen. A perennial candidate
for the French Presidency, Le Pen had his breakthrough in the 2002 election in which he
shocked observers of French politics by defeating Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin
in the first ballot of the election, and thus qualifying for the runoff with incumbent
President Jacques Chirac. Although he received less than 20% of the vote in the runoff,
Le Pen is very influential with voters on the far-right who are dissatisfied with the
mainstream parties, and he has always been an outspoken critic of supranational Europe.
(despite the fact that he served as a member of the European Parliament for many years).
Le Pen joined the left in criticizing the perceived neo-liberal slant to the Constitution, but
added in other dimensions to the campaign such as EU membership for Turkey and fears
over immigration. Thus, the left and right in France each presented their own cases
against the EU Constitution, and in doing so assembled an unconventional coalition to
ultimately defeat it.
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There was another dimension to the campaign that ties into some of the process
debate I discussed in chapter 1. Prime Minister Fabius repeatedly asserted that if the
Constitution was ratified in its current form, that it would be extremely difficult to
change.120 The Europeanization process has typically been undertaken in a piecemeal
approach that strings together various treaties over considerable periods of time. In his
successful campaign, Fabius asked voters to determine if the version of Europe they had
was the Europe they wanted; and appealed to their sensibilities that an imperfect union
should not be cemented in place. With the victory of the “no” vote in France and the
Netherlands, the process toward integration was halted, at least in the form of a singular
Constitution to serve as a binding contract between the EU and its citizens. There would
be no sweetening the pot and putting the matter to another vote in France or the
Netherlands, but rather a switch of focus to achieving more modest goals with the Treaty
of Lisbon.

Ireland’s Lisbon Flip Flop:
The French and Dutch voters’ rejections of the EU Constitution left little desire
amongst political elites in favor of integration to leave the ratification of Lisbon up to
voters in referenda. While eleven member states initially indicated that ratification of
Lisbon would be subjected to a domestic referendum, ten member states ultimately
declined to hold a referendum on Lisbon leaving Ireland as the only country to go
through with the process.121 Although every major political party represented in both
houses of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) favored ratification, the Irish High Court ruled
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in their 1986 decision in Raymond Crotty v. An Taoiseach that any treaty that altered the
EEC/EU decision making process had to be ratified by referendum.122 Thus, while the
other countries who had initially agreed to subject Lisbon to a popular referendum had
the luxury of ultimately pursuing different channels for ratification, the Irish were forced
to go through with the direct democratic process.
The Irish electorate fascinates scholars who study direct democracy over Europe,
because the Irish consistently report high levels of support for the European Union, but
also vote down treaties which are designed to strengthen it. The Irish were the only
member state to vote against the Treaty of Nice in 2001, and the lackluster campaign the
“yes” vote staged should have been a cautionary tale to the government that 7 years later
was leading the campaign to ratify Lisbon. Nevertheless, it was déjà vu all over again,
when similar problems in the “yes” campaign once again led to a situation in which a
perceived supporter of the EU threw a wrench in the integration process. However, Nice
would prove to be a dress rehearsal for Lisbon in every sense, as the government
responded to the “no” vote in the first referendum by simply placing it in front of the
voters again. While the Danes in regard to Maastricht had at least obtained some
concessions with the Edinburgh Agreement, the EU did not re-negotiate Nice with
Ireland. Nevertheless, the Irish were given reassurances that Nice would not undermine
their official status of neutrality in foreign wars.123
The Irish case in regard to Lisbon resembled the other cases in the sense that
every mainstream party in domestic politics was campaigning for a “yes” vote. Sinn
Fein, some members of the Green Party, a leading anti-abortion group, and the Workers
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Party composed the inchoately thrown together opposition that seemingly had little
chance of prevailing in a vote against the dominant parties in Irish politics. Nevertheless,
the opposition did have an ace in the hole in millionaire businessman Declan Ganley and
his recently formed Libertas organization. Although he spent much of his childhood in
the United Kingdom, Ganley always self-identified as Irish. One columnist noted that
Ganley was perhaps more Irish than the Irish themselves, and he viewed increasing the
scope of the European Union as an infringement upon Irish sovereignty and culture.124
With the presence of Ganley’s deep pockets, the “no” campaign in Ireland had
considerably more resources than the sometimes scantly-funded opposition campaigns in
other EU referenda, and in turn had the ability to wage a more professional campaign.
For its part, the “yes” campaign seemed every bit as aloof and detached from the
campaign as they had been in regard to Nice earlier in the decade. Several studies have
noted that the “yes” campaign seemed content to let the “no” campaign frame the
discourse, and waited too long to refute their characterization of the treaty. (Qvortrup
2009) The “no” campaign went to great lengths to capitalize on the government’s
ineffective campaign, by driving home the message that the Irish voters should reject any
treaty that they do not fully understand. Additionally, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern
was involved in an embarrassing trial concerning questionable business dealings, and his
attempt to resign and transfer leadership to Brian Cowen did little to keep the issue from
becoming a large distraction for the “yes” campaign.125
Charles De Gaulle once said that the problem with referendums is that people
always vote on the wrong question. The Irish government experienced this problem as the
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Sunday

campaign over Lisbon went on, and they were remarkably ineffective at leading and
guiding the debate. This allowed for the peoples’ worst fears over a strengthened
European Union to dominate the discussion, and no doubt this was exacerbated by Prime
Minister Cohen’s admission that he “had not read the treaty from cover to cover.”126 This
allowed Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams to counter that “You can’t expect people to vote
for something that you yourself haven’t bothered to read.”127
Additionally, the “yes” campaign received unfortunate assistance from foreign
leaders who appeared to be speaking down to the Irish voters. French foreign minister
Bernard Kouchner went so far as to call the Irish “ungrateful” for the assistance they had
received from the European Union, a clearly aggressive tactic that has a high likelihood
of backfiring.128
Matt Qvortrup (2009) characterizes the Irish “yes” campaign over Lisbon as the
model for what not to do in a referendum campaign. Qvortrup argues that the Irish
government broke a cardinal rule in the first election, by failing to clearly educate people
about Lisbon and structure the debate. “If voters do not understand an issue, they are
more likely to smell a rat-even if the proverbial rodent is absent,” Qvortrup states.129
Still, the American saying that elections have consequences should be true. The
“yes” campaign suffered a defeat on their first attempt on Lisbon 46.6%-53.1%.
Nevertheless, there was quickly an attempt to salvage the “no” vote and push the matter
to go in front of the people again. While a few changes were made to ameliorate the Irish
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peoples’ concerns, the biggest difference between the first and second round was the
worsening of the financial crisis in Europe. Whereas Irish voters revealed they were
mildly concerned about the economy in 2008, many voters the next year revealed they
had lost their job or had serious concerns about the state of the Irish economy. 130 A
headline in the Telegraph read, “Irish Voters Look to EU After Death of the Celtic
Tiger.” A former store manager quoted in the article insisted that, “When times were
good, we had the confidence to say no to Europe. We’ve learnt a lot in the past 16
months. These days jobs are hard to find. We need the economic backing and security of
Europe.”131 Whereas the Danes had a relatively modest shift from “no” to “yes” that lead
to a successful second referendum for the “yes” campaign, the Irish switch was
enormous, with 67% of voters accepting the Treaty of Lisbon they had just rejected the
year before.
The warming toward a European solution to Ireland’s problem in the society writ
large was not shared by everybody, however. Gerry Adams questioned why the first
referendum result had been ignored. Declan Ganley accused the “yes” campaign of
exploiting fears that a second “no” vote would have deleterious consequences for the
Irish economy at a time of crisis. However, nobody articulated this phenomenon better
than the Irish voter I quoted at the beginning of the chapter who asserted that he believed
the Irish people would be voting on Lisbon again and again until they said what their
leaders wanted to hear.

130

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ireland/6258052/Lisbon-Treaty-referendum-Irishvoters-look-to-EU-after-death-of-Celtic-Tiger.html#

90

Conclusion:
Scholars have paid scant attention to the advantages the integrationists enjoy in
the European process, and I believe we wrongfully shy away from addressing these
normative questions, as they get to the heart of what it means to be a democracy. While
integration is a noble pursuit advocated by many virtuous politicians, the ends simply do
not justify the means, and any integration arrangement that is going to be viable in the
long-run must attain a sense of legitimacy in the minds of the people it governs. The
process by which integration occurs is vitally important in determining which type of
Union there will be, and it seems essential that integrationists deal with setbacks in a
constructive manner, rather than trying to sweep them under the rug.
The European Union is not a typical state as it is not comprised of the democratic
tradition of a government that assumes office due to a victory at the ballot box and an
opposition that holds it accountable and seeks to replace it. As Majone and Mair
correctly note, the loyal opposition to the European Union comes from the people
themselves. The referenda are the checks the people have on the integration process, but
they are all too often bypassed when they are not constitutionally mandated and ignored
when they do not produce a favorable result. Scholars and politicians alike are actively
engaging in the debate as to why the people are flouting the wishes of their political elites
and resisting deeper integration, and these studies are without a doubt worthwhile
endeavors to pursue. However, at the end of the day, referenda are about trust, and if the
leaders of any supranational entity or member state are not trusted, the people are not
going to go along with what he or she wants to do.
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The process by which referenda outcomes are ignored if they go against the
government’s wishes is not conducive to crafting good government. By setting a moving
target the opposition can never hit, some domestic governments have rigged the game
against the loyal opposition to supranational Europe. As Peter Mair asserts, “Political
opposition gives voice. By losing opposition, we lose voice, and if we lose voice, we
lose control of our own political systems.”132
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“Government is a trust and the officers of the government are trustees. And both the trust
and trustee are created for the benefit of the people.”
-Henry Clay

Chapter 4: Trust in the European Union
Introduction:
Now that I have examined the perception of the capacity of the European Union
to manage European interests in a globalized world and the perception of a democracy
deficit, it is time to focus on the question of how these two independent variables predict
whether or not a respondent reports trust in the European Union. In this chapter, I will
turn my attention to conceptualizing institutional trust and explaining some of the
variance as to why a person trusts or tends not to trust the European Union.

Literature Review: Conceptualizing Institutional Trust:
Scholars have approached studying trust a number of ways. Some scholars have
attempted to clarify the concept conceptually, and establish a working definition that can
be applied across disciplines. Other studies have focused on how political institutions
become trusted over time. Finally, there are a number of studies that focus on what trust
means for the government in the short-run and the viability of the regime in the long run.

Defining Trust:
To begin, it is important to establish a working definition of the concept of
institutional trust. This is easier said than done, and when scholars take on this task, they
are met with warnings like that from Daniel Metlay (1999) who argues that this endeavor
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is a “journey into a conceptual quagmire.” To be sure, scholars have yet to establish a
singular working definition of institutional trust, and the risk of Sartori’s “conceptual
stretching” is seemingly high when taking on a concept that is deceptively simple at first
sight, but grows more complex upon further reflection. “Political trust is a concept that
people think they understand until they are asked to define it.”133 Marc Hetherington
(2005) shares the Metlay sentiment that one need look no further than how many
different definitions of political trust scholars use as an indication of how poorly defined
this concept remains.
An important first step to defining institutional or political trust is to differentiate
it from societal trust. Rational choice studies of societal trust have boiled the concept
down rather simply. Coleman (1990) argues that deciding whether or not to trust
somebody is nothing more than placing a bet in which one decides whether or not a
person can be trusted based upon the risks. Hardin (1993) adds in the dimension of a
perceived benefit of deciding to trust a person, setting up a decision of whether or not to
trust a person based on careful cost-benefit analysis. John Hudson (2006) argues that this
cost-benefit analysis for deciding whether or not to trust a person is not applicable to
institutional trust, but that does not mean that interpersonal trust plays know role in
predicting trust in political institutions. In his landmark study Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy ,(1994) Robert Putnam found that greater levels of
social capital found in regions in northern Italy led to greater degrees of trust in regional
governments and ultimately better institutional performance of the regional governments
in northern Italy.
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Scholars have made several different attempts to define institutional or political
trust with various degrees of success. Niklas Luhmann (1979) defines trust as a
commodity that helps political actors to achieve their goals. This definition is adequate at
the personal level, and I think that most people would think it is intuitive that a leader
who earned the trust of people would have more leeway in exerting his or her will over
the society than a person who had not earned trust. Nevertheless, the definition is lacking
in terms of missing the institutional component of the concept, which I argue should
entail an unknown individual being trusted as a given based on their being cloaked in the
authority of his or her position, such as a police officer.

Mark Warren (1999) similarly

misses the mark with his definition of trust as being something that peoples’ willingness
to follow the leadership of others.
William Gamson (1968) accurately captured the importance of institutional trust
by characterizing it as the “creator of collective power”. For Gamson, a basic level of
trust is essential for any democracy as it allows the government to avoid resorting to
coercion to exert its will or consulting with the people on every day to day decision.
Evoking the language of the Leviathan, James Madison noted in Federalist no. 51 that,
“government would not be necessary if men were angels.” The Founders were wary of
direct democracy, and believed the American Republic should be predicated on the
notion of representative government in which the people elect leaders to make decisions
on their behalf. Nevertheless, Madison in Federalist no. 10 indicated a distrust of
potential leaders as well, noting that “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
helm.”134
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Marc Hetherington (2005) has a definition of political trust that encompasses both
instrumental and normative aspects. Hetherington defines trust as “the degree to which
people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with their
expectations.”135 However, Hetherington himself cautions readers that perception of
performance can create a very high standard for a government to achieve, noting that
“people’s view of government is far different than its actual performance would
predict.”136 Hetherington cites a 1996 study by Haynes Johnson and David Broder to
make his point. Johnson and Broder (1996) had pointed out that in the era of the decline
in trust in the American government (second half of the 20th century) had actually been
characterized by dramatic successes for the United States including the expansion of civil
rights, improvement of the environment, strong economic growth, and the collapse of the
Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe.137

Where Trust Comes From:
Other scholars have focused on where trust comes from, and of course a debate
over which came first-better institutional performance or high levels of societal trustwhich establishes a nice chicken or egg first debate in the literature. Max Weber (1968)
argued that legitimacy for a government derives from its deference to citizenry by
making arguments that the citizenry find normatively appropriate.138 For Weber,
securing legitimacy is essential for democratic governance, as it reduces the transaction
costs to governing- the opposite of course, being the authoritarian regime that has to

135

Hetherington, page 9
Hetherington, page 10
137
Hetherington, page 10
138
Weber, page 213
136

96

spend so much of its resources coercing compliance. David Easton (1965) argued that in
order for a regime to enjoy a diffused sense of legitimacy, the electorate must trust the
government to do what is right most of the time. Fukuyama (1995) argues that trust
comes when there is a clearly-defined sense of community and a shared set of values.
For Fukuyama, the identification of the shared set of values is imperative for determining
an appropriate set of policies to achieve the shared goals.

The Importance of Trust:
Scholars have been pursuing a conceptualization of institutional trust since the
1960’s in the United States, and have consistently reiterated the importance of studying
this topic. Overwhelmingly, scholars have taken a normatively positive view of
institutional trust with Mara (2001) going so far as to say “(trust is) essential to a
democratic community’s well- being.”139 Arthur Miller (1974) parsed no words in
articulating the importance of examining institutional trust in his seminal study. Miller
stated that democratic regimes that have lost the confidence of their societies run the risk
of being overthrown by revolution.140 Miller views the relationship between state and
society as a psychological balance between institutional outputs and the public
satisfaction with said results. For Miller, the greater the disparity between the actual
outputs and expected outputs, the more likely the result will be that there is a decline in
institutional trust in the democratic institutions. Incidentally, this is similar to the relative
depravation argument that Davies (1962) makes for why revolutions occur. Davies’
important contribution to the revolution literature was that differences in expectations and
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outputs could ultimately culminate in a revolution to punish the regime that failed to keep
pace with the societal demands.
However, for Miller, the presence of widespread discontent with democratic
institutions in and of itself is not enough to warrant such a dramatic outcome, and in fact
can ultimately be beneficial as it can initiate a process of social change. Miller argues
that periods of social upheaval allow democratic institutions to showcase their flexibility
by self-correcting the disparities between public expectations of institutional performance
and the actual performance of said institutions and showcase an ability to manage
conflicts between cleavages in the society. Miller’s study differentiates short-term and
long-term distrust in government, arguing that they are separate problems with a different
set of remedies. He argues that short-run dissatisfaction with the government polices can
erode trust in democratic institutions, but can be remedied by something as basic as a
wave election in which “the rascals are thrown out”, and presumably replaced by
representatives with policy preferences that are more congruent with those of the majority
of he public. However, Miller argues that long-term discontent with governmental
institutions likely indicates the presence of deeply-rooted resentment in the society
between social cleavages, coupled with a pervasive notion amongst some groups in the
society that government does not work for their benefit. Miller states that these groups
over time tend to develop a sense of hostility toward both elected officials and
governmental institutions that cannot be ameliorated by simply “voting the bums out”.
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He argues that societies that experience a prolonged period of political malaise may be
characterized by political systems that are unable to manage societal conflict in a fully
operative manner.141
Jack Citrin (1974) made an important contribution to the trust body of literature
by focusing on the groups that reported higher levels of distrust in the government. Citrin
divides those who report high levels of distrust into 3 categories: “ritualistic” cynics who
report high levels of distrust in the regime no matter which party is in power, partisans
who are in the out of power party, and “alienated cynics” who believe there is no viable
alternative to whoever is in power. Citrin’s study finds that there are considerable
differences in orientation toward the regime and participation in political activities
between the three categories which requires each to be understood separately of the
others.142
Citrin also makes several noticeable departures from Miller’s seminal work.
Miller believed that for partisans, it was more complex than just being unhappy with the
other party’s policies when they were in office and thus in turn more likely to report
distrust of political institutions. Miller argued that Americans on the far-left and far-right
of the ideological continuum would likely be annoyed with centrist policies of both the
Republican and Democratic Parties, and therefore feel more alienated and be less likely
to report trust. However, Citrin notes that while elites have staked out clear leftist,
centrist, or rightist positions on some issues, others remain poorly ideologically defined.
For Citrin, it is hard to imagine that for issues where it is difficult to line up clear
ideological positions, that there could be clear political discontent amongst the political
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“extremes” that reduce trust. In the case of response to the financial crisis in Europe, it is
hard to imagine a clear left-right distinction, just as Citrin indicates, but failure to handle
the crisis in an acceptable manner could severely limit trust in the institution going
forward.
Marc Hetherington (2005) has reinvigorated the trust literature, particularly as
Hetherington has switched trust from being the dependent to the independent variable.
Hetherington argues that there has been a decline in trust levels in the United States since
Watergate that has reduced the desire for the American people for the government to
intervene in new policy eras. Thus, Hetherington attributes a decline in the American
peoples’ desire for their government to broaden its intervention into new policy domains
or deepen into existing ones not to a rightward shift amongst the American electorate, but
rather a distrust of the government to intervene with positive results.

Trust in Europe:
To date, very few studies have taken on the topic of trust levels in supranational
Europe. Mishler and Rose (2001) used regression analysis to analyze the trust levels in
Central and Eastern Europe of several institutions: the European Parliament, trade
unions, police, media, and the courts. Their results were then averaged to generate a
level of trust for all state institutions.
John Hudson (2006) finds that distrust is not engrained in people, but learned over
time through experiences. His study finds that dissatisfaction with the performance of
one institution will likely coincide with dissatisfaction in the institutional performance of

100

other institutions as well, a finding that could explain why American and European voters
are reporting distrust in a wide-variety of their political institutions.
Fischer and Hahn (2008) examine determinants of trust in the European Central
Bank. In their study they find that those who perceive inflation will be more likely to
distrust the ECB while those countries that have a national income on the rise will be
more likely to trust it. Unemployment levels did not have a significant effect on levels of
trust in the ECB in the Fischer and Hahn study.

Holes in the Literature:
There are still considerable holes in our understanding of institutional trust, and I
argue that scholars to date have paid scant attention of trust levels in the European Union.
To date, most work has focused on levels of trust in one institution within the EU, rather
than employ a holistic approach that examines the trust levels in the entire EU. The debt
crisis in several member states that use the Euro as their currency clearly represents a
case in which the European Union failed to enforce rules that it had on the books
pertaining to the caps it had placed on debt and deficit levels, and its failure to do so
could have significant consequences for other member states that followed the rules. A
debate rages on in the literature of how to classify the European Union and how to think
of the power balance between the sui generis EU and its member states. However, what
is lost in the debate is European citizens’ perceptions of the EU and its capacity to
manage external and internal pressures that have previously been dealt with by the state.
I argue that perception that the European Union is capable of withstanding globalization
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pressures and managing internal conflicts will be an important factor in determining
whether or not a citizen trusts the European Union.
Additionally, debate over the democratic deficit in the European Union has been
occurring since the days of the European Coal and Steel Community. Since the 1950’s,
scholars and statesmen alike have been grappling with the need to balance the desire for
greater cooperation and coordination at the continent level with the ability of citizens to
hold supranational Europe accountable. The EU has long been vulnerable to criticisms of
the democratic deficit but integrationists have sought to ameliorate this concern by
consistently strengthening the role of the European Parliament, the only democratically
elected branch of the EU government. With the switch from the cooperation to codecision procedure as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament secured
a true check over the legislative process, as the co-decision procedure ensured that the
Council and European Parliament must both pass identical versions of the same bill.
Subsequent treaties such as Nice and Lisbon have strengthened the role of the EP even
further, particularly Lisbon which granted the European Parliament control over the
entire EU budget and the now defunct second pillar of Common Foreign and Security
Policy and third pillar of cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. Nevertheless, the
Irish voters have rejected both Nice and Lisbon in referenda (and subsequently voted for
them) which clearly could be taken as a rejection of the terms to which they can influence
the European Union. What I mean by this, is that if one believes that strengthening the
European Parliament is a mechanism designed to combat the democratic deficit in the
European Union, Irish voters’ rejection of Lisbon and Nice can be taken as a clear signal
that this attempt to address the democratic deficit is inadequate. In this chapter, I will
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examine the effect the perceived democracy deficit in the European Union has on levels
of trust, expecting to find that individuals who perceive a democracy deficit will be less
likely to trust the EU than their counterparts who do not perceive a democracy deficit.

Theoretical Development:
For the purpose of this study, the definition of trust shall be the extent to which
political institutions sustain a pervasive sense of legitimacy amongst those whom
they govern. It is important to point out that this does not mean every individual who
occupies a position within the institutional framework enjoys widespread trust, nor do I
suggest that short-run variances in trust levels pose a significant threat to the viability of a
democratic regime. The heart of the matter gets to how much institutions are valued,
even when they produce policies that are contradictory to the public’s preferences or ask
the majority to make sacrifices for the good of the society.
The contribution this dissertation makes is to examine trust as the dependent
variable, much like the early studies done on trust in the context of the American
government. The recent sovereign debt crisis in the European Union has highlighted the
difficulties associated with uniting several disparate economies and political systems into
the same currency, and has revealed the limitations individual member states have for
dealing with the crisis as a result of their membership in the European Monetary Union.
In response to the 2008 recession in the United States, the American government
employed both fiscal and monetary tools aimed at reducing the severity of the recession
and limiting its duration. The Federal Reserve reduced the discount rate to extremely low
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levels, attempting to ameliorate banks’ concerns about lending money and in turn keep
money pumping into the economy. In addition, the federal government attempted to
stimulate the economy with a stimulus package that cut taxes, supplied cash-strapped
state governments with money to avoid layoffs, and invested in infrastructure projects.
Fiscal and monetary measures such as those I have mentioned are regularly employed in
countries in an effort to combat economic downturns or other crises. However, as a
result of their membership in the EMU, many European countries have forfeited their
ability to pursue a unilateral strategy to combat their economic woes, and have instead
been forced to work within the confines of policies such as the Growth and Stability pact
which set clear limits for deficits and debt levels that all the member states are supposed
to abide by.
By forfeiting their ability to take unilateral action, member states have essentially
left the EU the task of dealing with a crisis such as the sovereign debt crisis. However,
by 2011, it was clear to many observers that the European Union lacked a clear plan in
place to deal with the crisis. The level varying degrees to commitment to integration
were exposed by the various remedies that were suggested to combat the crisis. On one
extreme, some economists have called for the monetary union to kick Greece out, let their
economy bottom out and return quickly based off a unilateral solution that is tailored to
their individual needs. Most of the policies favored by Merkel and Sarkozy have been in
the middle of the spectrum, which have included bailout packages to shore up the Greek
economy in the short-run combined with austerity measures aimed at securing solvency
in the long-run. Recently the Commission has begun to call for Eurobonds, which would
be the pro European solution which would allow Eurozone members to share liability for
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the debt of all member countries, and thus ameliorate investor concerns. However, to
date, Germany has been adamantly opposed to such a measure, and the Treaty of Lisbon
explicitly stated that each member state is liable for its own debt.143
The failure of the European Union to achieve the type of political integration that
is necessary to combat an economic crisis of the magnitude the Europeans are facing is
the heart of this problem. However, I argue a primary reason for the shortcomings in
integration is the fact that the citizens of Europe have been reluctant to let integration go
further, and have thrown a wrench in the process of a number of times when given the
chance to do so.
Giandomenico Majone (2009) offers an interesting take on integration that I think
best represents what actually has occurred to this point. Majone argues that prominent
advocates of integration such as Jean Monnet fiercely advocated the concept of
supranational Europe to the point that the end result ultimately became a secondary goal
to the movement itself. Majone cites the work of Alan Milward (1992) who interviewed
a Belgian statesman who related to Milward that “everything that tends to European
organizations was good.” Majone refers to these people as “cryptofederalists,” and he
thinks of them as proponents of a federalized system who understand the political
constraints to achieving their vision for Europe, and therefore seek intermediate goals in
order to advance their cause the best they can in a hostile political environment.144 In the
words of Milward, for these people, “any form of integration, any common authority in
Western Europe, had become the indispensable guarantee for post-war security, and he
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(Spaak the Belgian foreign minister) became increasingly indifferent to what that
authority might be or do.”145
Majone goes on to argue that Monnet was astutely aware that integration in the
European Coal and Steel Community was likely to have an impact beyond the industrial
sector, and force the hands of member states to seek more cooperation in non coal and
steel sectors of the economy in order to maintain the viability of the first organization.
Majone believes that Monnet and the early functionalists were quick to write the epitaph
of the nation-state, and naïve to think that limited integration in the industrial sector of
the various economies would ultimately lead to broader economic integration and
political integration- at least the political integration that had the capacity and legitimacy
to act quickly and decisively in key moments. The hastily thrown together political
integration of Europe, according to Majone, is a direct result of a crytofederalist strategy
to “integrate by stealth,” in order to avoid having to win over popular support and attain
political integration by cultivating conducive public opinion and winning elections.146
The integration by stealth strategy has consequences though: including contributing to
the perception of a democracy deficit and creating political institutions that lack the
capabilities to enact optimal policies.

Variables and Hypotheses:
Conducted against the backdrop of the unfolding Greek budget crisis,
Eurobarometer 73 revealed the lowest level of trust recorded for the European Union
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since 2001. Europeans noted a wide variety of suspicions about the way the EU was
handling a variety of issues from the financial crisis to the proposed membership of
Turkey. The survey revealed noticeable reductions in the proportion of citizens that
believed their country benefited from membership in the European Union and the
proportion that believed in general that EU membership was a good thing for their
respective country. The fact that support had declined significantly from mid-decade
levels seemed to pose a stark contrast to a Commission spokesman’s analysis of the
survey, which suggested that the results indicated a strong public demand for “more
Europe” at a critical time. The spokesman’s response arguably flouts conventional
wisdom but nevertheless fits into a pattern of EU proponents’ analysis of setbacks
revealed by referenda or survey results. Regularly, when a referendum over Europe fails,
a response such as that of the deputy leader of the Irish Fein Gael party is heard: If only
the proponents had clearly stated their case, the public would have voted differently.
The notion that the public is generally on board with the broadening or EU power into
more policy domains and the deepening of cooperation into existing ones is pervasive
amongst the elites who support Europeanization. For subscribers to this theory, the
degree to which the public supports the European Union is mainly a function of how well
proponents can articulate the benefits membership provides to the citizens in the
respective member states.
What is missing from this analysis is that citizens in a wide-variety of EU member
states and prospective member states have consistently thrown a wrench in the integration
process when given the chance. Additionally, Eurobarometer polls have revealed
considerable apprehension about the European Union’s capacity to address major

107

challenges such as the debt crisis in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In this
paper, I am examining the relationship between perceptions of the European Union
capabilities and perceptions of a democratic deficit on the levels of trust citizens have in
the European Union.

Independent Variables:
There are two independent examine the relationship between the attitudes
Europeans have about the capacity of the EU to navigate the continent through the
difficult economic times brought on by the global recession and debt crisis that many
member states were facing during the early 21st century and their levels of overall trust in
the European Union. The data I use comes from Eurobarometer 71.3 which was
conducted during the summer of 2009. The Eurobarometer asks EU citizens the
following question: “To what extent do you agree or disagree that the European
Union has sufficient power and tools to defend its economic interests in the global
economy?” (EU tools on table) Respondents are asked to rate their answers on a fourpoint scale ranging from 1 (totally agree), to 4 (totally disagree) with tend to agree or
tend to disagree in between. I am using the preceding question as a proxy measure for
the perceived capacity of the EU to handle the economic crisis, and it is one of the two
independent variables that will be tested in this chapter.
As I have mentioned, it is my argument that the process of Europeanization is
slanted toward the proponents of a more integrated Europe. In referenda over the
integration process, citizens in Denmark, France, Ireland, and the Netherlands have
rejected key treaties and the EU Constitution, only to have the matter brought to a second
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(retry) vote or taken up by the Parliament in an effort to bypass the people altogether. In
regard to the Treaty of Lisbon, eleven member states initially signaled a desire to hold a
referendum over ratification, however only Ireland (who was constitutionally mandated
to do so) followed through. I argue that the process by which Europeanization occurs
contributes to a notion of a democratic deficit in the European Union. In this section of
the paper, I will examine the effect of the perceived democratic deficit in the EU on the
levels of trust in the supranational organization. Eurobarometer 73.1 asked EU citizens
to respond to the question: “My voice count s in the European Union.” This
independent variable (voiceEU) is a dichotomous variable with 1 being “tend to agree”
and 2 being “tend to disagree”.

Dependent Variable:
The dependent variable for chapter 3 is trust in the European Union. Respondents
in Eurobarometer 73.1 were asked whether of not they tend to trust the European
Union. (TrustEU) The responses are coded 1 for tend to trust the European Union and
2 for tend not to trust the European Union. As this is a dichotomous dependent variable,
I will use logistic regression to test the two independent variables effects on the
dependent variable of trust

Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Respondents who indicated that the European Union lacks sufficient
power and tools to defend its interests in the global economy will be significantly more

109

.likely to distrust the European Union than respondents who indicated the EU has
sufficient power and tools.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents who indicated their voice does not count in the European
Union will be significantly less likely to trust the European Union than respondents who
indicated their voice does count in the European Union.

Control Variables:
Inglehart (1970) and Karp et al (2003) argued that those with more knowledge
and understanding of the European Community/European Union would be more likely to
support their country’s membership in the EC/EU than individuals who did not have a
working understanding of the functioning of the EC. Eurobarometer 73.1 asked
respondents a series of questions on whether or not they had simply heard of components
of the EU such as the Commission, the European Parliament, or the European Central
Bank.
Trust in the domestic parliament (trustdom) is included as a control variable.
Christopher Anderson (1998) found that EU citizens have very little understanding
overall of the institutional makeup and the inner-workings of the European Union.
Therefore, Anderson argued that citizens make decisions about the EU based upon their
evaluation of the more salient domestic government.
The Eurobarometer asks respondents to identify whether or not their country has
benefited from membership in the European Union. Intuitively, I am inclined to think
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that those who indicate their country has benefited from membership in the European
Union will be more likely to trust the EU.
Membership in the original six is another factor that contributes to attitudes
toward the European Union. In the days of the permissive consensus, Lindberg and
Scheingold (1970) argued that the electorates in the original 6 were generally seen as
cooperative to the elite-driven efforts to craft a supranational European government.
Some theories about the breakdown of the permissive consensus Opinion polls have
consistently found less enthusiastic support for the EU in countries that joined the EC or
EU well after the original six countries of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg. I have recoded this variable into a dichotomous variable in
which 1 represents a country that was an original 6 member, while 0 represents a country
that joined the European Community or European Union at a later time.
Prior research has show ideology is a significant factor in whether or not
individuals feel positively toward the EU, with citizens toward the center of the
ideological continuum generally supportive of the EU, while those on the far-left and the
far-right are less likely to be supportive.
Inglehart (1970) and more contemporary research has suggested that age plays a
significant role in attitudes towards the EU, with younger citizens more inclined to view
the EU favorably than their older counterparts.
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V. Results and Discussion:
Table 4.1: Frequency of Trust Response

Tend Not to Trust EU: 6,148

40.3%

Tend to Trust EU:

59.7%

N= 15,249

9,101

Note: Respondents who answered “don’t know” were dropped.

As seen in the table 1, there was a distribution on the dependent variable question
of whether a person tended to trust (or no trust) the European Union that slightly favored
the respondents who reported they generally trust the European Union. The next table
will then examine the relationship between perception of the European Union’s capacity
to handle a crisis and perception of a democratic deficit and the dependent variable of
trust in the European Union.
Table 4.2: Effects of Perception of Capacity and Democracy Deficit on Trust

Variable:
EUtools
VoiceEU
UndeEU
TrustDom
Benefit
Orig 6
Ideology
Age
Constant

Beta:
-.458
-.729
-.613
-1.351
-1.784
.283
0.22
-.007
7.755

S.E.
032
0.45
.042
. 045
.046
.049
.014
0.001
.167

N= 15, 249 Cox & Snell R Square .331

Significance
.000***
.000***
. 000***
.000***
.000***
.000***
.104
.000***
.000***
Nagelkerke R Square .448

(Variable codes included in Appendix A
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As Table 2 shows, both independent variables were significant and in the
predicted direction.147 Respondents who believed the EU has the tools necessary to
defend its interest in a globalized world were more likely to report that they trust the
supranational institution. As I previously mentioned, the EUtools variable was coded 1
through 4, with respondents who most strongly agreed with the statement that EU has the
necessary tools being coded 1. The table below shows the change in levels of trust for
each of the 4 responses.

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
upper CI
0.4

Series2

0.3

Lower CI

0.2
0.1
0
1

2

3

4

The EU has tools necessary
Figure 4.1: Predicted Probabilities for EUtools

As the reader can see in the table, there was a considerable difference in trust
levels between those who agreed the EU had the tools to defend its interest in the
147

Trust was coded 0 for tend not to trust, 1 for trust. EU tools was coded on a scale of 1-4. Respondents
who agreed the strongest with the statement that the EU has the tools to protect interests were coded 1,
while those disagreeing the strongest were coded 4. Those who believed that their voice counts in the EU
were coded 1, those who believe their voice does not count were coded 2.
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globalized world and those who did not. This significant result offers support for the
hypothesis that this would be the case, and raises an important question about the
importance for the EU in maintaining a perception that it has the tools necessary to
defend European interests in a globalized economy.
In the early days of the Weimar Republic, hyperinflation as a result of the
government’s effort to rebuild infrastructure and finance reparations created widespread
hardships throughout Germany. While the economic situation stabilized considerably in
the late 1920’s, the damage had already been done as many peoples’ perception of the
Weimar Republic was tied closely to images of men carrying paychecks home in wheel
barrows or people burning worthless paper money to stay warm.
While not at the same degree faced by Weimar, the sovereign debt crisis the
European Union faces is the biggest threat the supranational government has had to face
since its creation as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. In economic matters, we constantly
hear how important perception of strength is, normally in the context of consumer
confidence or investor confidence in the United States. What the European Union is
facing is considerably more dramatic than these key economic indicators. The Euro is
the culmination of a decades-long process of integration, and its viability is integral to the
success of the European Union. The inability of the EU to project an image of being able
to maintain its currency and defend its interests in a globalized world could have longterm deleterious effects on trust levels in the European Union that could long out-live the
duration of the crisis itself.
The other independent variable is whether or not a person feels they have a voice
in the EU. Scholars have long-debated the notion of a democracy deficit in the European
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Union, but to date I found no studies that directly connected the notion of a democracy
deficit to levels of political trust. The results for this variable again offered support for
the hypothesis that those who felt they have a voice in the European Union were
significantly more likely to report they trust the EU.

Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities for Voice EU

As the reader can see from Table 4.4, there is a significant difference in
percentage of respondents who report trust in the European Union between those who
feel their voice counts in the European Union and those who feel their voice does not
count. A respondent who agreed that his or her voice counts in the European Union
(coded 1 on the chart) was much more likely to report trust in the European Union than a
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respondent who believed their voice does not count. The data indicates that there is over
a 70% chance that a respondent who believes their voice counts in the European Union
will report trust, compared to a roughly 55% chance for respondents who report their
voice does not count.

Thus the perception of a democratic deficit had a significant and

negative relationship with levels of trust being reported. (if a person reports the presence
of a democratic deficit, they are more likely to report they do not trust the European
Union.)
While the results for this question are from EU respondents writ large, and
interesting variation on this question would be to focus solely on respondents from
Eurozone countries that are being coerced to adopt austerity measures. Nevertheless, it is
important to make the argument that these results suggest the European Union must find
a way to make its citizens feel as if they have a voice in the project in order for them to
feel as if they can trust the EU. Consisting of 27 member states and having a population
of over 500,000,000, the European Union could easily be viewed as too remote, large,
and impersonal to give its citizens a voice. While intergovernmental agreements between
member states has long been a norm for conducting EU business, the recent response to
the sovereign debt crises has been dominated by two member states in particular, France
and Germany. Having decisions imposed on them from a supranational institution that
they benefit from is perhaps one thing, but having decisions imposed from leaders of
other member states is something different entirely. The nature of the response to the
sovereign debt crisis should be an important case in when we study the democratic deficit
in future research.
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This one example of EU decision making aside, there are institutional
characterizations that perhaps contribute to the perception that the EU is remote and out
of touch with its citizens. A federalist model of government in the United States provides
citizens with several levels of government, and astute American citizens know they can
apply pressure at any level in order to get more favorable policies. The federalist model
for Europe that Jean Monnet envisioned has not come to fruition for the EU.
Furthermore the structure of a typical parliament, consisting of a government and an
opposition that provide a credible alternative to it, is missing in the EU. In order to
maintain high levels of trust, it will be essential the EU strives to provide its citizens a
voice.
As the reader can see from table 2, all the control variables were significant and in
the hypothesized direction, with the notable exception of ideology which came out in the
hypothesized direction, but did not get significance. (see Appendix A for the description
of how all the variables were coded). I recoded ideology into the absolute value from the
mean in order to test for the theory that ideological moderates would behave differently
than ideological extremes, regardless of which side of the spectrum they were on.
Previous research has found that those on the center, center-right, and center-left are
generally more supportive of the European Union than those on either ideological
extreme. While I found that those on the ideological extremes were less likely to trust the
European Union, interestingly enough, this was the only independent or control variable
that the model revealed was not statistically significant.
The remainder of the findings were generally in agreement with previous
research, and will likely make sense to the reader intuitively. One control variable I was
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interested in was trust in domestic parliament, as there can be several different ways to
determine how those variables could be connected. In cited Anderson (1998) whose
study found evidence for the hypothesis that citizens will evaluate the EU based off their
evaluation of their domestic parliament. My analysis found some support for his claim,
as those who reported that they trusted the EU were likely to report they trusted domestic
institutions as well, and the converse was true as well that those who reported not to trust,
reported distrust in domestic and the supranational institutions across the board.
However, I could have easily imagined respondents who reported a lack of trust in the
European Union reporting trust in the domestic parliament, which they could believe is
more receptive to democratic pressure and has better capability to manage the country’s
interests. However, the results did not come out in that direction, and generally found
that those who reported distrust in political institutions, in general, reported distrust
across the board (just as Andersen suggested). I would be interested to see if future
studies are able to either replicate his findings or give another explanation for what could
be occurring.

Conclusion:
The sui generis nature of the European Union makes it fertile ground for research,
and studying trust levels in the EU is an important topic that scholars should not shy
away from. The sovereign debt crisis in several EU member states has plunged the entire
Eurozone into jeopardy, and therefore the capability of the EU to manage the crisis in a
manner that is acceptable to its citizens is of the utmost importance.

In the wake of

Maastricht, some scholars began to question the ability of citizens to make their voices
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heard within the context of a more broadly and deeply integrated European Union.
However, given the powers the EU enjoys, it is important to hold it to the same standard
we would hold any democracy: to earn the trust of its citizens by providing effective,
responsive government.
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“The Prince must have people well disposed toward him. Otherwise, in times of
adversity, there is no hope.” –Niccolo Machiavelli

Chapter 5: Europe without Europeans?
Introduction:
On January 1, 2002, a group of journalists decided to see for themselves how the
new currency, the euro, would be perceived on its first day of circulation. Understanding
that citizens in the key economic centers of Europe such as Paris, Rome, and Berlin
would likely be somewhat comfortable with unfamiliar currency, the journalists decided
to take their experiment to the outskirts of the European Union. On the first day the euro
was circulated, one of the journalists visited a small mom and pop store in the Greek
isles, and sought to pay for his merchandise in euros. The lady at the cash register
examined the money, made a comment about its appearance, and then put the money into
the cash register. The result was similar in the other locations the journalists visited that
day, and on the macro level, the transition away from member state currencies to the
Euro went as seamlessly as anybody could have expected.
The euro is now a decade old, and there is still some intermittent grumbling about
the negative effects of the change. For example, many of my Italian friends complain
about prices being rounded up during the conversion to euro from lira, and thus some
associate the euro with higher prices and thus less purchasing power. Nevertheless, some
negative feelings were inevitable in a transition of this magnitude, particularly in regard
to money, something many people feel insecure about in the first place. Additionally, in
Germany, the stability of the Deutsche Mark was a considerable source of pride for a
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society that was reluctant to openly embrace many of its cultural traditions for much of
the time period since defeat in World War II.
Nevertheless, the transition to the euro was remarkably successful, and it has
without a doubt simplified business and travel on the continent. One of the strategies the
architects of the singular currency employed to alleviate the tension of the transition was
to put the faces of respected leaders in the member states on the new currency. The
importance of this was to mix familiar leaders with the new currency in an attempt to
retain some traditions amidst the transition.
The European Union is regularly dogged by an appearance of excessive
bureaucracy and ineffectiveness. One of the most famous quotes regarding supranational
Europe (colloquially and falsely attributed to Henry Kissinger) is the idea of “who do you
call if you need to call Europe?” The quote pertains to a lack of sense amongst EU
citizens and representatives of other countries as to who the primary representative of the
European Union is on the international stage. The lack of a clear answer to that question
is commonly perceived as an inability for the EU to rapidly respond to a crisis in the
same manner that a state could, particularly one led by a president or prime minister
given some constitutional leeway to act in a manner that he or she sees fit to in the time
of a crisis.
Another negative symbol of the European Union was the literally empty chairs
when the French recalled their representative to the Council amidst a dispute with the
other member states over the procedure of qualified majority voting (qmv). Before the
Luxembourg Compromise, each state had the ability to veto every EC measure it objected
to, creating a situation where advancement of a European agenda was rendered nearly
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impossible. The empty chairs of the French delegation thus became a symbol of member
state resistance to supranational Europe, even in cases were the vast majority of states
were on board.
The era of so-called eurosclerosis is over, and the Single European Act,
Maastricht Treaty, and Treaty of Lisbon have all strengthened the institutional capacity of
the European Union in an effort to confront challenges faced by the people of the Europe
in a unified manner. Nevertheless, the Inglehart (1970) notion of a new, emerging
supranational polity is still not the norm, and many Europeans cling to their respective
national identities. What gets to the heart of the matter is a question posed by Michael
Bruter (2003) “Is it fair to create a new citizenship and fully institutionalized European
political system if citizens do not ‘feel’ European yet?”148
In the aftermath of the Risorgimento, the unification of the Italian peninsula, the
Italian intellectual Massimo d’Azeglio famously remarked, “We have made Italy, now
we must make Italians.” The quote has been recited countless times as a reminder that
the legitimacy of any political entity is derived from people who feel a sense of belonging
to it. From the beginning, integration has been viewed as an elite-driven enterprise the
reluctant masses will tolerate until the effects of integration become salient. As I
discussed in Chapter 3, the people have emerged as the opposition to the European
project, particularly since the breakdown of the permissive consensus in the 1960’s or
1970’s.149
For their part, the staunchest proponents of European integration have worked
tirelessly to cultivate the emergence of a “European” identity. At the first meeting of the
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European Coal and Steel Community, Jean Monnet famously told the delegations in
attendance that they were not there to discuss coal and steel, but rather Europe. “We are
uniting a people, not forming a coalition of states,” was the Monnet perception of the
project.150 To that end, integrationists have worked tirelessly to downplay the traditional
national identity, and cultivate the transnational European identity. As part of the effort
to generate support for the political institutions, leaders of supranational Europe have
introduced numerous symbols of European unity such as the European Union flag,
anthem, and even a holiday known as “Europe Day.” However, there is really no one
European symbol that is particularly salient, and I venture to guess that if one asked
people on the streets to identify some, there would be some confused responses. The
reality is that the retention of strong national identities exists in the contemporary
European Union, and this perhaps is an obstacle to the crafting of supranational
institutions at the European level. There are undoubtedly shortcomings in institutional
performance of the European Union to date that have an impact on institutional trust.
However, is the creation of a European identity a solvent that can wash away some of the
imperfections and give the European Union a better chance of securing the reforms that
can lead to better supranational government?

Literature Review:
The importance of identity in maintaining the social contract between state and
society has been a heavy focus in the literature since Rousseau’s update of the social
contract theory in the nineteenth century. Rousseau believed that any sense of legitimacy
for the state must be derived from the acceptance of its power from the citizenry. Weber
150
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(1946) believed that without a strong sense of identity, the state would not retain a longterm ability to coerce its citizens, and maintain its monopoly on the right to use force.
A portion of the literature over identity has focused on trying to narrow in on a
commonly understood definition of the concept. Abrams and Hogg (1990) define social
identity as a psychological link between social groups or communities that ties everybody
in the group or community together. Tafjel (1981) describes social identity as, “that part
of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of
social groups (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to
that membership.”151 Hermann and Brewer (2004) describe two stages to the formation
of a group identity. The first stage is to define “who is us?” Hermann and Brewer
elaborate on that by saying the social identity must have a clear differentiation of who the
“in” and “out” groups are. The second stage is to define “what are we?” The duo
describe this second phase as identifying what attributes the group shares (whether they
be values, characteristics, symbols, etc.) that is the basis for that identity.152
A seminal study that shed light on how identity is determined is Benedict
Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983). Anderson weighed in on the debate of
whether identity is ascertained through primordial instinct or constructed by the desire to
be part of a community. Anderson’s seminal work argued that identity is constructed,
and that people search for their identity in hopes of being part of a community based off
of a common characteristic such as ethnicity, religion, linguistic ties, etc. Anderson’s
work has been used by so many scholars as a framework for studying identity, and
Anderson himself used his constructionist theory to explain nationalism, a sense of pride
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people have in their community. It is important to note that nationalism can be
constructed at the state level (for example the nationalism many French people felt in the
Napoleonic Wars) or at a level that has nothing to do with state boundaries. (for example
Kurdish or Basque nationalism, which is a sense of nationalism between respective ethnic
groups who reside in more than one state.)
The nature of citizens’ orientation toward supranational Europe has always been
difficult to conceptualize, as the definition of what “Europe” is to begin with is anything
but definitive. William Wallace (2000) documents the expansion of Western Europe into
Central and Eastern Europe, and wonders where the geographic limits of “Europe” might
be. At the time of Wallace’s study, there was a wide-range of applicants to the European
Union, including on one end states such as Poland and the Czech Republic, whose close
geographic proximity and similar cultural identity to Western European appeared to make
them obvious future member states. A hazier category in the middle of the spectrum
would be Romania and Bulgaria, places where political systems were traditionally more
linked to the Soviet Union, and the prospects for consolidated democracy seemed to face
more challenges than some counterparts in Central Europe, at least at the turn of the new
century. A third category included applicants such as Turkey and Morocco, whose
geographic, cultural, and religious features made some members of the EU question if
these states were part of “Europe” at all. Wallace (2000) writes about the difficulty in
determining who is “in” and who is “out” and the consequences such decisions will have
on international relations in the post-Cold War era.
Majone (2009) argues that the questions posed by studies such as Wallace (2000)
are still very much unanswered. Majone states that the Iron Curtain provided a clear
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boundary to the east for “Europe” and that the presence of a clearly-defined border in the
Cold War era made the construction of a European identity easier. Majone states that
expansion of EU institutions into new areas and the debate over expansion into others has
made the concept of “Europe” more difficult to define, and in doing so made the
construction of a European identity even tougher to conceptualize.153 Lipmann (1943)
reminded Americans that the establishment of a more centralized federal government in
the United States was made possible because of common political institutions, shared
history, and common language of the various states. Majone (2009) states the obvious
that Europe does not have that, and this makes the construction of a European identity
much more difficult.
Despite the difficulty, scholars and journalists have tirelessly worked to shed light
on the nature of a transnational European identity. Lewis (1993) discusses the notion of
spreading a European identity by sword going back to the days of Caesar, through
Napoleon Bonaparte, and finally ending with the defeat of Hitler’s Third Reich in 1945.
Lewis recounts the failures of crafting a European identity by sword, and expresses the
opinion that it may occur at the ballot box instead.154
The transition to cultivating identity by peaceful means occurred in the aftermath
of World War II, when neo-functionalists such as Haas (1956) began to write about the
need to downplay traditional national identities and cultivate a European identity.
Inglehart (1970) wrote about a shift of values in the younger generation in the postindustrial states away from the “materialist” values of their parents’ generation toward
post-materialist values. Inglehart noted that the new generation thought about issues such
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as the environment or human rights, and solutions to these problems that would require
political coordination beyond the traditional state level.
Citrin and Sides (2004 in Hermann et. al) analyzed Eurobarometer data over
time, and found a steady increase in identification as European since the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty. However, the caveat to the study is that the duo also found that
citizens reported greater intensity to their respective national identities than identity with
Europe.
However, Stryker (1980) found that the concept of identity does not have to
necessarily be placed into mutually-exclusive categories. Stryker’s work is often
associated with the concept of overlapping identities, meaning that individuals can share
attachment to multiple varying entities simultaneously. Hermann et al. (2004) elaborate
by explaining there can be three different ways for multiple identities to relate to each
other. The concept of the nested identity best describes the relationship between a citizen
of a member state of the European Union. (or a resident of any state in the United States)
In this form over overlapping identities, each identity is related at a general level, and it
works its way smaller like Russian Matroyoshka dolls. For example, a person could
consider themselves European and also Italian, the Italian identity being a narrower
identity, but still fits inside the first category. From there, the person could also be from
Genoa and still have pride in that identity without drawing away attachment from the
broader political entities of Italy and the European Union.155
The mere existence of a political community, however does not guarantee that
people will have any attachment toward it, a fact that was not lost on Jacques Delors in
the wake of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. “(These decisions) will not be
155
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enough to make Europe a tangible reality. Each and every Community citizen needs to
feel bound by the links which unite European society.”156 David Michael Green (2007)
asks if there are any Europeans in Europe. His study examines the development of the
European identity over time, and finds that for the most part, there is quite a strong sense
of European identity.157 A chapter in his book entitled, “how European are the
Europeans,” Green finds that many Europeans claim they would make the same types of
sacrifice for Europe as they would make for their own country.158
Bruter (2003, 2005) also finds the growth of a common European identity. Bruter
(2005) examined people who participated in focus groups’ response to symbols of
European integration. Bruter disentangles the political identity concept by separating it
into two components: cultural and civic. The cultural component Bruter defines as a
sense of belonging to a particular group, while the civic component refers to
identification of citizens with a political structure.159 Bruter used symbols to prompt a
reaction from the focus groups in order to ascertain how the respondents view their
orientation to Europe. He found that some respondents identified heavily with cultural
symbols that brought up feelings in them such as unity and peace, while others identified
more with civic symbols such as declining relevance of a national border. Interestingly
enough, Bruter found that there was little difference in the normative appraisal of
supranational Europe between the two categories. Additionally, his study finds that many
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of the respondents felt that the more exposure their fellow citizens have with Europe, the
more likely they are to feel European.160

Theoretical Development:
In the latest installment of the acclaimed Critical Citizens series, Pippa Norris
(2011) describes the various levels of system support. At the most specific level, support
for a political system is determined by approval incumbent office holders. At this level, a
citizen can feel as if a president or prime minister has personal characteristics that they
admire such as honesty or responsiveness to the public concerns. Additionally, at this
most specific level of support, the citizen will have a generally positive orientation to the
platform of the office holders. The most specific in nature, this first level of system
support requires the citizen to have knowledge of a certain leader and his or her platform
before the office holder can attain the citizen’s support.
Heading toward more diffuse support, the next most specific level is confidence
in regime institutions. At this level, the person may not know anything about the specific
office holders of any given institution, but nevertheless report confidence that the
institution will perform as it was designed to. At the confidence of regime institutions
level, a citizen will have an expectation of being treated fairly by any representative of
the regime such as a police office or a judge, by virtue of that person representing the
regime.
In the middle of the spectrum is evaluation of the regime performance. In this
level of support for the regime, the citizen does not just approve of the regime outputs as
in the most specific first case, but also the process by which outcomes are attained.
160
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Citizens who have this level of support expect that after the political process works its
course, that outputs will be satisfactory.
The second most diffuse level of system support is approval of core regime
principles or values. At this level, the citizen feels as if the institutions exist to promote
the values and principles of the citizenry. At this level, support for the regime is diffuse
enough that the citizen can disagree with the policies of any incumbent office holder,
while still believing they are simply pursuing different means to a similar end.
The most diffuse level of system support is national identity. In this level, the
citizen feels a sense of belonging to the community the system represents. This
sentiment is typically expressed through feelings of patriotism or nationalism, both of
which are typically promulgated through symbols of a shared cultural identity. Norris
points out that this level of diffuse support for a regime is taken for granted in many
countries, but fundamentally lacking in many countries such as Afghanistan.161
I find Norris’ classification a helpful tool in differentiating levels of system
support. If Norris is correct, the cultivation of a shared identity is the pinnacle of
achieving diffuse system support. The question becomes, if the European Union can
achieve a strong sense of supranational identity amongst its citizens, could that be the
solvent that washes away some of the low marks the European Union gets in areas such
as managing the financial crisis or providing its citizens a voice in how the EU is run?
However, perhaps each level of system support is in some ways determinant on the next
and an institution has to climb them in the same manner a person climbs a stairwell.
Perhaps a common supranational identity cannot be realized until the European Union
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attains milestones such as positive evaluations of its performance and approval of core
regime principles.
What Constitutes European Identity?
Bruter (2005) separated those with a sense of identity toward Europe into two
categories: cultural and civic. In the focus groups he analyzed, Bruter reported finding a
generally even mix of those who felt a cultural connection to other people in Europe and
those who felt a civic bond to a political community. Bruter’s study found generally
positive orientation toward Europe in both groups. Eurobarometer 71.3 asked
respondents to identify the two most prominent features of the “European” identity from
a list of choices. In Table 5.1 below, I have summarized the results.

Table 5.1 What constitutes a European Identity
Trait:
Democratic Values
Geography
A Higher Level of Social Protection
Common History
Common Culture
Entrepreneurship
Religious Heritage
Don’t Know
There is no Identity
Other

% Mentioned
40.8
26.6
26.4
22.5
21.6
11.5
8.5
7.8
3.6
0.6

% Not mentioned

.

59.2
73.4
73.6
77.5
78.4
88.5
91.5
92.2
96.4
99.4

In a bit of a surprise, democratic values were by far the most cited component of a
European identity, which is clearly what Bruter would refer to as a civic orientation
toward supranational Europe. This is an interesting finding for two reasons. On the one
hand, it makes countries who do not share a religious heritage or common history with
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Europe a possible fit into supranational Europe if they can sustain democratic institutions
and commitment to the democratic process. With emphasis on a political feature as a
leading component of the European identity, states on the periphery of cultural Europe
such as Turkey could have a better prospect for EU membership than if the main
emphasis was something cultural like religious heritage. As a caveat, however, I wonder
if there could be a Wilder effect in which people respond to questions such as this by
downplaying the importance of religion or common culture in order to not come appear
as prejudiced in their response.162
The emphasis on democratic values as being a key component of the European
identity sets the bar very high for the political institutions of the European Union. As I
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, there is often a strong perception of a democratic deficit in
the institutions of the European Union who are often viewed as remote and detached the
citizens they represent. However, if the European identity is constructed based primarily
off of commitment to democratic values, what does this say about the fit of a political
entity that often lacks it with this culture? Is the European Union essentially unEuropean in this regard?

How does a sense of European Identity relate to trust in the European Union?
In addition to asking respondents what constitutes a European identity,
Eurobarometer 71.3 asked Europeans how European they feel. Responses were coded on
a four-point scale ranging from 1 (strongest sense of European identity) to 4 (weakest
sense of European Identity. In Table 5.2, I have included identity into the model I used to
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predict trust in the previous chapter. My hypothesis is that people with a strong sense of
European identity will be more likely to trust the European Union than those with a
weaker sense of European identity.

Table 5.2 Effects of Perception of Capacity, Dem. Deficit, and EUID on Trust

Variable:
EUtools
VoiceEU
EUID
UndEU
TrustDom
Benefit
Orig 6
Ideology
Age
Constant

Beta:
-.438
-.673
-.208
-.584
-1.328
-1.733
.290
.021
-.006
7.845

S.E.
.032
.045
.026
.043
.045
.046
.05
.043
.001
.168

Significance:
.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***
.119
.000***
.000***

________________________________________________________________________
N= 15, 208
Psuedo R2= .3016
As the reader can see from table 5.2, those who reported a stronger sense of
identity (lower scores) were more likely to indicate that they trust the European Union
than those who reported having a weaker sense of a European identity. This finding is
not surprising, and offers further support for the Bruter finding that those who establish a
civic European identity often have a positive orientation to the European Union. In table
5.3, I show the effect the independent variable identification has on the likelihood of
trusting the European Union for each of the 4 values the Eurobarometer uses to measure
identification with Europe (1 being the highest, 4 being the lowest).
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Figure: 5.1: Predicted Probabilities for European Identification
As the reader can see in Table 5.3, there is roughly a 20% difference in the
likelihood of trusting the European Union between those who claim a strong sense of
European identity compared with those who have a weak or no sense of European
identity. This finding is interesting and different from the findings reported in Chapter 4,
because the variables discussed in that chapter were all institutional in nature. It is very
intuitive that people who believe the European Union has the tools necessary to manage
Europeans’ interests in the globalize world and those who feel there is no democratic
deficit in the European Union will be more likely to trust the EU, because those sort of
institutional variables really get to the heart of what capabilities the EU has to generate
optimal outputs in terms of performance and responsiveness. The identity variable, on
the other hand, is a cultural variable that some may believe has little to do with the
orientation a citizen has to a political institution. Nevertheless, the results offer
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considerable support for the hypothesis that those who feel European will report greater
trust levels in the supranational government that ties all Europeans together than those
with a weak European identity.

What does “identity” mean for the viability of the European project?
Despite the political and economic shortcomings in the European Union that most
people acknowledge, there is undoubtedly a European identity emerging amongst
European citizens. In table 5.1, the reader can see that less than 4% of respondents
indicated a lack of presence of any European identity, a finding that is consistent with
prior research such as Green (2007). The degree to which people feel European or
citizens of their respective nation-state matters as well, and clearly the retention of
national identities is stronger than federalists like Jean Monnet would have likely
preferred. However, identity does not need to be nicely compartmentalized in mutuallyexclusive categories, but can be overlapping. Discussing this topic with one of my
classes, a young man once drew a parallel to college football: noting that students at
LSU cheer for the Tigers, but will also chant “SEC” when another member of the
conference is playing in the championship game. In this same sense, a citizen can be a
proud Italian or Belgian, yet still feel a sense of affinity with citizens from different
member states of the European Union.
As Norris (2011) states, establishing a sense of identity with a political entity is
the most diffuse support the regime can attain. In this world, disliking certain leaders or
policies can be overlooked in the short-run, as the person still feels a sense of belonging
and commitment to the institution writ large. If the European Union is having an effect
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of cultivating an identity amongst the people from its various member states, it could be
on the road to achieving diffuse support, despite the notable shortcomings I have
discussed throughout the project.
Some of the most staunch integrationists have maintained that grumbling over EU
outputs is not a rejection of supranational Europe, but merely the version of supranational
Europe that the EU has currently established. While there was plenty of reluctance
amongst various citizens of the original 13 American states to turn over more sovereignty
to a stronger federal government, the founding fathers of the republic realized that the
integration levels established by the Articles of Confederation were not suitable for
obtaining optimal results. If the Europeans have a sense of identity, there may be little
will for scrapping the project entirely, regardless of what lies ahead with all the
uncertainty surrounding the fate of the monetary union. The integrationists may have an
argument that the lack of integration is the driving force behind the perceived failures of
the European Union, and that deeper integration may be the key to establishing a more
perfect union between the disparate member states. However, as discussed in Chapter 3,
the people have long been the brakes to the integration effort, and any attempt to achieve
greater levels of integration will almost certainly have to be achieved with the electorate
on board.
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Conclusion:
The future of the European Union is unclear, and many challenges exist that could
potentially undermine the project and reverse the trend of integration that has occurred
for over 60 years. However, despite the political shortcomings of supranational Europe,
there is clearly a sense of identity emerging amongst the various people who compose the
European Union. What effect this development has on the future viability of the project
remains to be seen.
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Conclusion:
In this dissertation, I have found that perceptions of the capability of the European
Union to manage European interests and perceptions of a whether or not there is a
democratic deficit in the European Union have significant effects on the likelihood of a
person reporting trust in the EU. Additionally, I have found that those with a stronger
sense of European identity will be more likely to report they trust the European Union
than those with a weaker identity.
These findings are interesting, and I hope the reader of this dissertation has come
away with a new way of thinking about the process of integration and the democratic
deficit. If there is any point I am trying to make in all this, it is to argue that political
trust is not something that is just given, but rather earned through the long process of
assembling effective political institutions that can withstand various pressures placed
upon them, and produce outputs that meet the citizens’ expectations. Additionally, the
institutions must be viewed as being responsive to the citizenry, which is difficult to do in
most any country, let alone a supranational entity that encompasses 27 states and over
500 million people.
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe, and the manner in which the EU has
responded, have brought this topic to the forefront. I was inspired to pick this topic for
my dissertation as I began watching the crisis unfold in 2010, and after two years of
studying it closely, I must admit that I have no idea what the outcome will be for the
European Union. Some political observers have noted that if the European Union is able
to withstand this crisis, it could emerge with more credibility than it had before the crisis
began. Others have suggested this could be a huge stumbling block in the integration
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process, in which gains of the last two decades are not only halted, but even reversed.
While none of us can predict the future, the importance of this period in determining the
short and medium-term direction of the European Union is just about universally agreed
upon.

Calls for Future Research:
There are so many different ways a person approaching this question could take a
project like this, all of which could offer insight into what is happening right now in
terms of public opinion of the trustworthiness of the European Union. The first that
comes to mind is some sort of before and after the crisis approach, to see how attitudes
changed after a period in say 2010 or 2011. Using Eurobarometer data from several
different surveys, a researcher could compare how perception of the EU changed as a
result of the crisis. A study like this one only gives us one snapshot of what the attitudes
were at one period in time. While this makes a contribution, an interrupted time series
model would give us a great view of how attitudes changed as a result of the crisis.
Another way to approach this project would be to look how respondents answered
the questions by country. I approached this study looking at trust levels reported by
citizens across the EU, and no distinction from one country to the next. However, the
pain from the sovereign debt crisis has undoubtedly been felt more in Greece, Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and Ireland than in member states such as the United Kingdom,
Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. It would be interesting to see if the
perception of the project was different in the states that have been more adversely
affected than in states that so-far have not had much of a problem. The differences in

139

perception of a democratic deficit, in particular, would be interesting to compare between
countries like Germany and France who have dictated the direction of policies, and
Greece who have been more dictated to.
The European Union gives us so much to study, as it is a unique political
institution that does not resemble any political structure in the world. Nevertheless, the
sui generis nature of the EU should not give it special treatment from scholars, and it
should be held to the same normative standards we hold for any functioning democracy.
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Appendix:

Dependent Variable: Trust in the European Union:
1: Tend to trust
0: Tend not to trust

Independent Variables:
The EU has sufficient power and tools to maintain its economic interests in a globalized
world
1 = Totally Agree
2 = Tend to Agree
3= Tend to Disagree
4= Totally Disagree
My Voice Counts in the EU
1= Tend to Agree
2= Tend to Disagree
To What Extent do you feel European?
1= To a great extent
2= Somewhat
3= Not Really
4= Not at all

Control Variables:

I understand how the European Union works
1=Tend to Agree
2= Tend to Disagree

Trust in Domestic Parliament:
1= Tend to Trust
2= Tend not to Trust
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Taking everything into account, would you say on the whole that our country has
benefitted from EU membership?
1= Benefitted
2= Has not Benefitted

Is the respondent from an Original 6 Country? (France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Belgium, the Netherlands, or Italy?)
1= Yes
0 = No
Ideology= Eurobarometer asks Ideology questions on a 1-7 scale… I recoded based on
absolute value from the mean.
4 (moderate) = 0
3/5 =
1
2/6=
2
1/7=
3
Age= Respondent’s Age
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